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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
General Background and Objective 
In this thesis, ve study hov lot-size producers and electric pover 
suppliers determine optimal prices and other critical economic 
quantities (e.g., the order quantities for the lot-size producers and 
. the allocation priorities for the electric pover suppliers). Recently, 
the traditional economic order quantity model has been extended to the 
case of monopolistic and oligopolistic lot-size producers under profit 
maximization (see e.g., Min (1992a)). In this thesis, ve further extend 
the general framevork of the monopolistic and oligopolistic lot-size 
models by considering various aspects of model environments (e.g., 
competitive behavioral assumptions (Cournot vs. Bertrand), reduction of 
setup and inventory holding costs, purchasing and sales strategies, and 
performance criteria ( profit maximization vs. ROIl (return on inventory 
investment) maximization). On the other hand, for electric pover 
suppliers, ve formulate an expected total surplus (i.e., profit plus 
customers' net benefits) maximization model as a nonlinear programming 
problem when the amount of electric power demanded and its valuation to 
customers as well as the amount of electric power supplied are random. 
In addition, under the assumption that customers are risk-averse, we 
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formulate an interruption insurance model to transfer the risk of 
customers to the risk-neutral electric power supplier. The effects of 
errors due to the assumptions that customers' valuation and/or the 
amount of electric power demanded are constant over time are 
investigated via numerical examples. A brief introduction of background 
and motivation for our study (first for the lot-size producers, then for 
the electric power suppliers) is as follows. 
Keeping an inventory to meet potential demand in the future is 
prevalent in most businesses. Manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers 
general have a stock of goods on hand. How to determine the "inventory 
policies" (i.e., when and how much to produce as well we how much to 
charge per unit) becomes a critical issue for lot-size producers. A 
simple model representing production-inventory situation is given by the 
well-known traditional economic order quantity (EOQ) model (see e.g, 
Hillier and Lieberman (1990)). 
The traditional EOQ model formulates the production-inventory 
system by considering only cost factors consisting of a fixed setup 
cost, a variable unit production cost, and an inventory holding cost. It 
should be pointed out, however, that the inventory policies of numerous 
businesses may depend on its relations to other business policies 
regarding pricing and sales. In this thesis, we attempt to integrate the 
policies of inventory and pricing/sales so as to maximize the policy 
maker's profit. In a recent paper by Min (1992a), it is assumed that the 
demand of customers depends on the price a lot-size producer charges and 
a profit maximizing model of inventory and quantity discount pricing 
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policies for a monopolist is presented. Also, Min (1992b) extended the 
profit maximizing model to the case of a symmetric oligopoly, under 
Cournot behavioral assumptions, consisting of lot-size producers of a 
single homogeneous product who compete with each other for the same 
potential buyers. In this thesis, we extend the general frameworks of 
Min (1992a, 1992b) to different environments. First, we compare and 
contrast the economic implications of equilibria under Cournot and 
Bertrand behavioral assumptions and perform sensitivity analysis on the 
decision variables such as market price and order quantity with respect 
to the parameters such as number of competing lot-size producers and the 
levels of setup and inventory holding costs. This competitive inventory 
and pricing model forms the basis for an economic decision model of 
setup cost and inventory holding cost reductions. The setup and 
inventory holding cost reductions model demonstrates that the 
competition among lot-size producers induces setup and inventory holding 
cost reductions. Also, by incorporating the special structure concerning 
the purchasing and sales activities of intermediary firms and by 
modifying the traditional EOQ model accordingly, we will show how to 
formulate the profit maximization problem for the intermediary firms. 
Finally, for a single seller, we compare and contrast the optimal 
inventory and pricing policies under profit maximization vs. ROIl 
(return on inventory investment) maximization when demand is linear in 
price. By studying the optimality conditions and the corresponding 
closed-form optimal solutions, several interesting economic implications 
are derived. 
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For an electric power supplier, we assume that the electric power 
supply is stochastic and the objective of supplier is to maximize the 
total surplus (i.e., profit plus costomers' net benefits). A critical 
issue of such an electric pover supplier is how to allocate the scarce 
electric pover in case of potential shortages. In our model, we employ 
an allocation scheme called the priority rationing which allocates the 
scarce power to the higher valued consumption units via pricing of the 
allocation priorities. Moreover, we improve this allocation scheme by 
incorporating the commonly shared random factors into the customers' 
valuation of electric power and the estimation uncertainty into the 
total amount of electric power demanded. In addition, under the 
assumption that customers are risk-averse, we formulate an interruption 
insurance model to transfer the risk of customers to the risk-neutral 
electric pover supplier. 
An Explanation of the Thesis Organization 
This thesis is composed of five papers which may be suitable for 
publication. In particular, the third paper "oPTIIAL SELLING qUANTITY 
AND PURCHASING PRICE fOB. INTERlEDllB.Y fIB.IS" appears in International 
Journal of Operations and Production lanagement volume 11, number 10, 
page 64-68, 1991. Some portions of the fifth paper "PRIORITY 
RATIONING /PRICING Of ELECTBlC POVEll UNDER CUSTOIEB.S' V ALU!TION 
UNCERTAINTY" appears in Twenty-ninth Annual Power Affiliate .leport 
section 23, page 279-289, Electric Power Research Center, Iowa State 
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University, May, 1992. 
In a recent paper by Min (1992b), he introduced a competitive EOQ 
profit maximizing model under Cournot behavioral assumption. In contrast 
to Cournot behavioral assumption, in the first paper "ECoNonC OlDER 
QUANTITY (EoQ) JoDELS UNDER ColPETITIoN VITH SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS", lie 
present an alternative behavioral assumption called Bertrand behavioral 
assumption (see e.g., Friedman (1990)). By examining the equilibrium 
conditions and subsequent sensitivity analyses under these tliO 
assumptions, lie derive economic relations of critical elements of EOQ 
models (such as order quantities per cycle) as llell as critical elements 
of the microeconomic market theory (such as market prices). 
In paper 2 "! ColPETITIVE Eoq JoDEL VITH OPTIONS TO REDUCE SETUP 
AND INVENTORY HOLDING COSTS", the basic model environments (such as 
setup and per unit production costs as llell as customer demand 
functions) and the assumptions on the model environments are analogous 
to Cournot model in Min (1992b) with the exception that we assume the 
options of investing in reducing the setup and inventory holding costs 
are available. By examining the economic implications in equilibrium and 
the subsequent sensitivity analysis, we present a unique insight (cf. 
Porteus (1985) and Zangllill (19S7»as to llhy several Japanese and 
American producers are striving to reduce the setup costs under ever 
increasing competition. Specifically, it llill be shown that, for a 
profit maximizing producer, as the number of competing producers 
increases, his optimal strategy dictates that he reduce his setup and 
inventory holding costs. 
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In paper 3 "OPTIIAL SELLING QUANTITY A..ND PURCHASING PRICE FOR 
INTERlEDllRY FillS", how intermediary firms can optimally determine both 
selling quantity and purchasing price of a product is investigated. By 
incorporating the special structure of intermediary firms' environments 
and by modifying the conventional economic order quantity (EOQ) model 
accordingly, we provide optimal decision rules regarding the selling 
quantity and purchasing price for intermediary firms. 
In paper 4 "AN ANALYSIS OF OPTillL INVENTORY AND PRICING POLICIES 
UNDER LINEAR DElAND", for a single seller, we compare and contrast the 
optimal inventory and pricing policies under profit maximization vs. 
ROIl (return on inventory investment, see e.g., Rosenberg(1990» 
maximization when demand is linear in price. By studying the optimality 
conditions and the corresponding closed-form optimal solutions, several 
interesting economic implications are derived. In particular, we show 
that when a cost factor such as the setup cost, inventory holding cost 
per unit per unit time, or per unit ordering cost after the setup is 
sufficiently high, the choice of the objective between profit 
maximization and ROIl maximization is inconsequential to the seller in 
so far as his optimal decisions are concerned. 
In paper 5 "PRIORITY PRICING AND INTEB.R.UPTION INSURANCE OF ELECTRIC 
POVER UNDER CUSTOIERS' VALUATION UNCERTAINTY", we extend the existing 
work (see e.g., Chao et ale (1986), Chao et ale (1987), and 
Vilson(1989» on the priority rationing of electric power by 
incorporating commonly shared random factors (such as temperature or 
humidity) associated with customers' valuation of electric power and the 
7 
uncertainty associated with the estimation of the total amount of 
electric power demanded. Next, under the assumption that customers are 
risk-averse, we formulate an interruption insurance model to transfer 
the risk of customers to the risk-neutral electric power supplier. 
Finally, via numerical examples, we attempt to investigate the effects 
of errors due to the assumptions that customers' valuation and/or the 
total amount of electric power demanded are constant over time (when 
they actually vary due to random factors). 
The rest of my thesis is organized as follows. First, those five 
papers mentioned earlier will be presented sequentially. Next, the 
general conclusion about this thesis is followed by the last paper. 
Finally, the literature cited in the general introduction and the 
general conclusion will be made. 
8 
PAPER 1. 
ECONonc ORDER QUANTITY (EOQ) IODEL UNDER COIPETITION 
lIITH SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
9 
ECONonc ORDER qUANTITY (EOq) IODELS UNDER COIPETITION 
nTH SENSITIVITY ANAL ISIS 
Cheng-lang CHEN and I. Jo lIN 
Iova State University 
ABSTRACT 
Ve extend the profit maximizing economic order quantity (EOQ) model with 
a constant demand rate over time to the case of a symmetric oligopoly 
consisting of sellers of a homogeneous product who compete with each 
other for the same potential buyers. A key feature differentiating this 
paper from the extant literature on the economic order quantity (EOQ) is 
that the competition aspects of the inventory theory are analyzed not 
only with respect to the number of competing sellers, but also with 
respect to two strategic behavioral assumptions (called the Cournot and 
the Bertrand behavioral assumptions) on the sellers regarding their 
competitors. Under these behavioral assumptions, the formulations and 
equilibrium strategies of our models explicitly depend on the number of 
competing sellers. From the resulting equilibrium conditions and 
subsequent analyses, we derive economic relations of critical elements 
of EOQ models (such as order quantities per cycle) as well as critical 
elements of the microeconomic market theory (such as market prices). 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper extends the profit maximizing economic order quantity 
(EOQ) model ~ith a constant demand rate over time to the case of a 
symmetric oligopoly consisting of sellers of a single homogeneous 
product ~ho co~ete ~ith each other for the same potential buyers. The 
primary goal of this study is to understand economic implications of the 
resulting equilibrium in terms of critical elements of EOQ models (such 
as the sales quantity per unit time, the order quantity per cycle, the 
production (or order) cost and inventory holding cost) as ~ell as 
critical elements of the microeconomic market theory (such as the market 
price, the demand elasticity of buyers, and the number of competing 
sellers). 
Specifically, ~e ~ill derive and compare the sellers' decision 
variables such as optimal economic order quantities, sales quantities 
per unit time, and the market prices in equilibria under a Cournot-like 
behavioral assumption (i.e., each seller first predicts his competitors' 
sales quantities per unit time in maximizing his o~ profit; see e.g., 
Oren, Smith and Vilson [16]) and under a Bertrand-like behavioral 
assumption (i.e., each seller first predicts his competitors' per unit 
price in maximizing his o~n profit; see e.g., Friedman [5]). 
Furthermore, via sensitivity analyses, ~e derive and compare the 
directions and magnitudes of changes in the aforementioned decision 
variables ~ith respect to changes in inventory holding cost, setup cost 
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and the number of competing sellers under both Cournot-like and 
Bertrand-like behavioral assumptions. 
The idea of employing profits as a performance measure of EOQ type 
models has been explored as early as the 1950's (see, e.g., Vhitin [24] 
or Smith [19]). Ladany and Sternlieb [10] not only uses the profit 
levels as the performance measure, but also provides insights on 
relations among price, cost, and demand by making the demand dependent 
on the price and the price dependent on the cost and a fixed mark-up. 
Brahmbhatt and Jaiswal [2] extends the previous model by incorporating 
variable mark-up as a function of a capital intensity measure and by 
maximizing profit over the order quantity and the capital intensity. 
Arcelus and Srinivasan [1] also extends Ladany and Sternlieb [10] by 
treating demand as a function of price, price as a function of a 
variable mark-up rate times a unit cost under profit maximization over 
the order quantity and the variable mark-up rate. Moreover, Monahan [15] 
as well as Lal and Staelin [11] developed quantity discount schemes for 
the seller. Lee and Rosenblatt [12] extended Monahan [15] by 
incorporating more realistic features (e.g., constraints imposed on the 
amount of discount that can be offered). The rationale for the quantity 
discount in these papers is the cost savings resulting from coordination 
of sellers' production quantities and buyers' order quantities under the 
assumption that both buyers as well as sellers are EOQ based decision 
makers. The assumption that buyers are EOQ based decision makers is 
relaxed in a new quantity discount EOQ model in Min [13]. In Min [13], 
the rationale for the quantity discount is the seller's exploitation of 
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the heterogeneous preferences of the buyers regarding their purchase 
sizes. More recently, in Min [14], for both uniform pricing and quantity 
discount pricing (under the heterogeneous buyers' preferences 
assumption) cases, hov to incorporate competition aspects of sellers 
into EOQ models based on Cournot-like behavioral assumption is 
discussed. 
Also, under the assumption of dynamic and deterministic demands, 
there have been numerous studies investigating the optimal relations of 
production schedules, prices, and inventories (see e.g., Gaimon [6], 
Pekelman [17], Kunreuther and Schrage [9], and Thomas [21]) Thomas [22] 
investigates the optimal relations of production quantities and prices 
under the assumption of stochastic demands. Moreover, in Gaimon [7], 
the assumption of a single firm is replaced by a duopoly, and the 
optimal relations betveen production capacities and prices are studied 
vithin a differential game framework. Also, in Dockner and Jorgensen 
[4], optimal pricing strategy under competition is examined and 
non-cooperative as veIl as cooperative equilibria results are obtained. 
In Teng and Thompson [20], an oligopoly model is analyzed and optimal 
advertising policies are obtained when production costs obey a learning 
curve. Ve note that the models constructed and analyzed in the last 
three papers are also time dependent dynamic models. 
In this paper, we viII refer to the model under the Cournot-like 
behavioral assumption as the Cournot model while the model under the 
Bertrand-like behavioral assumption as the Bertrand model. For both 
models, we assume that all critical economic quantities sellers must 
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determine such as the optimal economic order quantity and price schedule 
are made under the framework of static decision making (cf. dynamic 
decision making framework; see e.g., [6], [17], [9], and [21]). In 
order to highlight the optimal relations among the critical economic 
quantities that are derived under the static decision making framework, 
we will make the following assumptions. Ve assume: 1) the demand is 
deterministic and constant over time; 2) production occurs (or orders 
arrive) instantaneously; 3) there is no learning effects in setup or 
production. Also we will not consider discounting prices and costs over 
time and other time dependent features such as promotion and 
advertising. In addition, we will assume that each seller can produce 
(or order) sufficient amount of products to meet any quantity demanded 
by buyers. Under these assumptions, we formulate Cournot and Bertrand 
models consisting of a systematic oligopoly of n sellers (i.e., sellers 
are identical in all economic respects such as production costs) 
offering a homogeneous product. From these formulations, we obtain 
symmetric Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. For both Cournot and 
Bertrand models, the formulations and equilibrium strategies explicitly 
depend on n, the number of competing sellers in the market. In 
equilibria, we derive interesting economic implications regarding 
prices, demand elasticities, the number of competitors, average and 
marginal production costs and average inventory holding costs. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 and 
3, we construct and analyze the Cournot model and the Bertrand model 
respectively. In sections 4 and 5, we perform the sensitivity analyses 
14 
on the Cournot model and the Bertrand model respectively. In addition, 
in section 5, ~e compare and contrast the results from the equilibria 
and sensitivity analyses of the Cournot and Bertrand models. Finally, 
in section 6, ~e summarize and conclude. 
15 
2. THE CDURNDT IDDEL AND ECDNOIIC IIPLICATIONS IN EQUILIBRIUI 
For the construction of the Cournot Model, we will closely follow 
Min [14]. Ve assume that there are n identical sellers (producers or 
distributors) offering a single product. Also we assume that buyers have 
perfect information about the per unit prices n sellers charge. Hence, 
in equilibrium, all sellers will charge the same per unit price, p, the 
market price. For each seller i, i = 1, ..• , n, as in the cases of 
traditional EOQ models (see e.g., Hillier and Lieberman [8]), we assume: 
1) the goods are produced (or ordered) in equal numbers, Qi at a time; 
2) all Q. units arrive without delivery lag; 3) no shortage to a buyer 
1 
is permitted. Ve also assume that, for each seller i, the total cost per 
cycle consists of a production (or order) cost and an inventory holding 
cost. The production (or order) cost per cycle is represented by K + 
C(Qi) where K is the setup cost and C(Qi) is the production (or order) 
cost incurred in producing (or ordering) Qi units after the setup. On 
the other hand, the inventory holding cost is characterized by h, 
inventory holding cost per unit per unit time. As implied earlier, K, 
C(Q) and h are identical for all sellers. Ve further assume that C(Q) is 
strictly increasing and convex in Q, i.e., C'(Q) ) 0 and C"(Q) ~ o. 
The sales quantity (to buyers or customers) per unit time for the 
entire market is characterized by d(p), a function of per unit market 
price p. Ve assume that the sales quantity, given a price, is constant 
over time. Also we assume that the sales quantity function is strictly 
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decreasing in p, i.e., d'(p) < o. Under the monotonicity assumption of 
d/(p) < 0, the inverse function p(d) exists (with p/(d) < 0). The 
inverse function p(d) specifies the price p that clears d units in the 
market. Ve will assume that the inverse function p(d) is concave in d, 
i.e., p"(d) ~ o. Just as in microeconomic theory (see e.g., Varian 
[23]), we can refer to p(d) as the inverse demand function while d(p) as 
the demand function. Since the demand function d(p) is assumed to be 
constant over time, so is the inverse demand function p(d). 
Given the above definitions and assumptions, we develop a 
Cournot-like framework as follows. Ve assume that each seller i, i = 1, 
... , n will predict the total sales quantity per unit time of his n-l 
competitors, d_ i . Under this prediction, seller i maximizes his profit 
per unit time over his sales quantity per unit time di and economic 
order quantity Qi. For the total sales quantity per unit time for the 
entire market, d. + d ., the corresponding per unit market price is 1 -1 
given by p(di + d_ i ). Hence, the total revenue per cycle for seller i is 
p(d. + d .) Q .. And the corresponding total cost per cycle and the cycle 1 -1 1 
length are given by K + C(Q.) + hQ~j(2d1·) and Q.jd. respectively. Given 1 1 1 1 
these expressions for the total revenue, cost, and the cycle length, the 
problem of maximizing profit per unit time for seller i, x., can be 
1 
stated as follows. 
Max 
d. ,Q. 
1 1 
x· = p(d. + d .)d. - (K + C(Q.))d.jQ. - hQ.j2 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 (1) 
The first order optimality conditions of the maximization problem (1) 
are: 
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In order to derive the corresponding second order sufficient 
condition(s) for optimality, we first obtain the second order 
derivatives of the profit as follows. 
2 a 'l'. 
2 a 'l'. 
1 = p"{d. + d .)d. + 2p'(d. + d .) 1 -1 1 1-1 ad~ 
1 
2 a 'l'. 2 
______ 1 = (K + C(Q.) - Q.C'(Q.))/Q. 
ad.aQ. 
1 1 
2 a 'l'. 
1 
aQ~ 
1 
1 1 1 1 
= d
1
·(- Q~C"(Q.) - 2(K + C(Q.) - Q.C'(Q.)))/Q~ 1 1 1 1 1 1 
From our assumptions that p'(o) < ° and p,,(.) ~ 0, we have 
____ 1 < 0. Therefore, the second order sufficient condition for 
ad~ 
1 
optimality is simply 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
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2 2 2 ]2 a 'C. a 'C. [ a 'C. 1 1 1 > 0 ---- -ad~ aQ~ ad.aQ. 
1 1 1 1 
(7) 
2 a 'C. 
llhere __ 1, 
2 2 a 'C. a 'C. 
__ 1_, and __ 1 are given by ( 4), ( 5 ) and ( 6) • 
ad~ 
1 
ad.aQ. 
1 1 
aQ~ 
1 
Throughout the rest of this paper, lle llill assume that the second order 
sufficient condition is satisfied for the region of interest. In 
addition, lle llill assume that the resulting profit level of each seller 
i, i = 1, "', n, evaluated at the optimal sales quantity per unit time 
and order quantity per cycle is strictly positive (i.e., no seller llill 
exit from the market). 
So far lle have examined the optimality conditions of a single 
seller. Ve nOll proceed to derive an equilibrium of n sellers. Under our 
assumption of identical sellers, there exists a symmetric equilibrium 
(see e.g., Oren, Smith, and Vilson [16]) where 
= d2 
and = Q2 
= 
= 
= d n 
= Q n 
(8) 
(9) 
i.e., the sales quantity per unit time as well as the economic order 
quantity are identical for all sellers. In this symmetric equilibrium, 
the total sales quantity per unit time from all competitors of seller i, 
d . is equal to (n-1)d. for i = 1, "', n. Therefore, the corresponding 
- 1 1 
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equilibrium conditions of the optimality conditions (2) and (3) are 
given by 
p'(nd.)d. + p(nd.) - (K + e(Q.))/Q. ~ 0 11111 
-d. (e' (Q. )Q. - K - e(Q.))/Q~ - h/2 ~ 0 11111 
(10) 
(11) 
Let us first examine equilibrium condition (10). The corresponding 
demand elasticity f, f ~ p(d)/(p'(d)d) by definition (see e.g., Varian 
[23]), evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium point becomes: 
(12) 
Hence, in the symmetric equilibrium, equation (10) can be restated as 
(13) 
Equation (13) states that, given a fixed number of competitors n, as the 
demand becomes more elastic (i.e., If I gets larger), the equilibrium 
price gets closer to the average production cost. Or as the demand gets 
more inelastic (i.e., If I gets smaller), the equilibrium price gets 
farther away from the average production cost. If we view the term 
-n-f-n-!~l- as a markup rate, the economic implication is that the markup 
rate is larger when the demand is more inelastic. On the other hand, 
given a fixed level of elasticity, f, we observe that as the number of 
competitors increases (i.e., as the competition gets more intense), the 
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price gets closer to the average production cost. Or as the number of 
competitors decreases (i.e., as the competition gets less intense), the 
price gets farther away from the average production cost. Ve also 
observe that as the number of competitors decreases, the markup rate 
increases. In addition, we note that if -1 < nf < 0, the price is 
negative. Furthermore if nf = -1, it can be easily verified that no 
order quantity per cycle Qi satisfies equation (10). Hence, throughout 
this paper, we limit our analysis to the cases where nf < -1. i.e., nf < 
-1 will be assumed. 
Let us now examine equilibrium condition (11). By rearranging 
terms of condition (11), we have 
(I + C(Qi»/Qi - C'(Qi) = hQi/(2di) (14) 
Equilibrium condition (14) states that for each seller i, i = 1, n, 
the average production cost is equal to the sum of the marginal 
production cost and the average inventory cost per unit. The economic 
implication is that the per unit production cost is strictly higher than 
the per unit inventory cost at the equilibrium since the marginal 
production cost is assumed to be positive. Also we note that if (I + 
C(Qi»/Qi ~ C'(Qi)' it can be easily verified that no order quantity per 
cycle Qi satisfies equation (11). Hence, throughout this paper, we limit 
our analysis to the cases where 
(I + C(Qi»/Qi > C'(Qi)' i.e., (I + C(Qi»/Qi > C'(Qi) will be assumed. 
Ve note that the relation between the equilibrium sales quantity 
per unit time di and the corresponding economic order quantity Qi for 1 
21 
= 1, ..• , n is implicitly determined by (13) and (14). By simultaneously 
solving conditions (13) and (14) given p(.), C(·), h, K, and n, we can 
numerically determine the values of di and Qi. 
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3. THE BERTRAND IODEL AND ECONOnC IIPLICATIONS IN EQUILIBllI1)J 
The basic model environments concerning EOQ based decision making 
sellers are analogous to those in section 2. Also ye assume that the 
sales quantity function is strictly decreasing in p, i.e., d'(p) < o. 
In contrast to the Cournot-like frameyork presented in the previous 
section, ye develop a Bertrand-like frameyork as folloys. Let us denote 
the per unit price seller i charges by Pi' i = 1, '.', n. Ve assume that 
each seller i, i = 1, "', n yill predict his n-1 competitors' prices, 
Pj' j = 1, "', n; j f i. Under our assumptions that the product is 
homogeneous and that buyers have perfect information about the per unit 
prices n sellers charge, the folloYing argument holds. If seller i's 
price Pi is set such that Pi is strictly higher than the lowest price of 
his n-1 competitors (i.e., Pi > P-i = min {Pjl j = 1, "', n; j f i}), 
then no buyer ~ill purchase from seller i. On the other hand, if seller 
i's price p. is set such that p. is strictly lo~er than the lowest price 
1 1 
of his n-1 competitors (i.e., Pi < P-i)' then no buyer yill purchase 
from any of his competitors. Finally, if seller i's price Pi is set such 
that p. is equal to the lowest price of his n-1 competitors (i.e., p. = 
1 1 
P-i) and there are k sellers with the same minimum price (including 
seller i), then each of the k sellers will equally share the total sales 
quantity in the entire market. Therefore, for i = 1, "', n, seller i's 
profit per unit time, Xi' conditioned on his price Pi is shoYn as 
follows. 
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Ti = Pid(Pi) - d(Pi)(K + C(Qi))/Qi - hQi/2 (15) 
if Pi < P-i = min {Pjl j = 1, ... , n; j * i}. 
(16) 
if p. = P . and there are k sellers ~ith the same minimum 1 -1 
price (the sales quantity per unit time of seller i is 
= 0 (achieved by neither producing nor ordering) 
if p. > P .. 1 -1 
(17) 
Seller i ~ill maximize his profit per unit time given in relations 
(15)-(17) over his price Pi and order quantity Qi. In the case of 
relation (17), since seller i's optimal policy is neither producing nor 
ordering, no further analysis is ~arranted for. Hence, throughout the 
rest of this section, ~e ~ill concentrate on the analysis of relations 
(15) and (16). For the analysis, ~e ~ill assume that profit relations 
(15) and (16) are non-negative and concave in Pi and Qi in the region of 
interests. Under these assumptions, the optimality conditions for Pi and 
Qi are: 
Either 
p. < p . 
1 -1 
aT. 
from (15), ~ = d(p.) + d'(p.)(p. -vp~ 1 1 1 
1 
(18) 
(19) 
Or 
(20) 
Pi = P-i (21) 
8r. 2 ~ = (d(Pi)/k)(K + C(Qi) - QiC'(Qi»/Qi - h/2 = 0 (22) 
1 
where there are k sellers with the same minimum price 
-p. = P " 1 -1 
The optimal price p. and order quantity Q. are implicitly determined 
1 1 
from relations (18)-(20), or relations (21) and (22). 
So far we have derived the optimality conditions of a single 
seller. Ve now proceed to derive an equilibrium of n sellers. Under our 
assumption that the product is homogeneous, seller i, i = 1, "', n, can 
capture the entire market by slightly under-cutting the n-1 competitors' 
prices. Hence, so long as the current level of profit is positive, each 
seller will under-cut the n-1 competitors' prices. This incentive to 
under-cut will vanish only if the current level of profit is zero. 
Therefore, under our assumption of identical sellers, the following 
relations hold in an equilibrium. 
Pi = P2 = ... = Pn 
Pid(Pi)/n - (d(pi)/n)(K + C(Qi»/Qi - hQi/2 = 0 
i.e., r· = 0 for i = 1, "', n. 1 
(23) 
(24) 
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The corresponding relations on the order quantity Qi's are given by, 
Q1 = Q2 = •.. = Qn 
(d(Pi)/n)(I + C(Qi) - QiC/(Qi))/Q~ - h/2 = 0 
or. 
i.e., ~ = 0 (from relation (22)) for i = 1, 
1 
n. 
(25) 
(26) 
A symmetric equilibrium of n sellers is implicitly determined by 
equilibrium conditions (23)-(26) while seller i's (i = 1, "', n) 
equilibrium price Pi and order quantity Qi are implicitly determined by 
(24) and (26). By simultaneously solving conditions (24) and (26) given 
d(.), C(·), h, I, and n, we can numerically determine the values of p. 
1 
and Qi' From these values and equilibrium conditions (23) and (25), the 
complete set of equilibrium prices and order quantities can be 
numerically determined. 
Ve examine equilibrium condition (24) first. Equilibrium condition 
(24) can be rearranged to become, 
p. = (I + C(Q.))/Q. + hQ.n/(2d(p.)) 1 1 1 1 1 (27) 
Condition (27) states that for seller i, i = 1, "', n, the price (= per 
unit revenue) is equal to the sum of the per unit production cost plus 
the per unit inventory holding cost. cf. conditions (2) and (10) in 
section 2 under the Cournot-like behavioral assumption where the 
conditions imply that the marginal revenue with respect to the sales 
quantity per unit time is equal to the marginal cost with respect to the 
sales quantity per unit time. 
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Let us now examine equilibrium condition (26). By rearranging 
terms of condition (26), we have 
(28) 
The economic interpretations of equilibrium condition (28) are analogous 
to those of condition (14) in section 2. That is, for each seller i, 1 = 
1, "', n, the per unit production cost is equal to the sum of the 
marginal production cost and the per unit inventory cost per unit. This 
implies that the per unit production cost is strictly higher than the 
per unit inventory cost at the equilibrium since the marginal production 
cost is assumed to be positive. Also we note that if (I + C(Qi»/Qi ~ 
C'(Qi)' it can be easily verified that no order quantity per cycle Qi 
satisfies equation (26). Hence, throughout this section, we limit our 
analysis to the cases where (I + C(Qi»/Qi > C'(Qi)' i.e., (K + 
C(Qi»/Qi > C'(Qi) will be assumed. Furthermore, from conditions (27) 
and (28), it can be easily seen that in equilibrium the price (per unit 
revenue) is strictly greater than the marginal production cost (by two 
times the per unit inventory holding cost). This result is consistent 
with that in section 2 under the Cournot behavioral assumption. Finally, 
we note that since the equilibrium profit level of the Bertrand model is 
always zero while the equilibrium profit level of the Cournot model may 
be positive, the Cournot profit level is higher than or equal to the 
Bertrand profit level. This is consistent with the micro economic market 
theory (see e.g., Varian [23]). 
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4:. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS UNDER COURNOT IODEL 
In this section, we investigate the sensitivity of the sales 
quantity per unit time di and order quantity per cycle Qi in equilibrium 
with respect to the given parameters of the Cournot model depicted in 
section 2, the inventory holding cost h, the setup cost K, and the 
number of competing sellers n. Our analysis of sensitivity will be based 
on differential calculus (especially the implicit function theorem; see 
e.g., Chiang [3]), which requires variables (or parameters) to be 
continuous rather than discrete. Hence it will be necessary to treat the 
number of competing sellers n (n ~ 1), which is hitherto assumed to be 
an integer, as a continuous variable. Ve present the justification for 
treating n as a continuous variable (to the extent possible) by slightly 
rephrasing a portion of section 3, " Modeling Entry ", in Seade [18] as 
follows: 
Ve will allow n to be an actual continuous variable (or parameter) 
on which each economic quantity (e.g., price p) depends differentiably 
according to the given relations, but we restrict our attention to 
integer realization of this variable. Then, if we define x as any 
economic quantity dependent on n (e.g., economic order quantities), 
its change when one additional seller enters into the market is 6X = 
x(n+l) - x(n). It is clear that (sign 6X) = (sign x'(n)) whenever the 
latter sign does not change in the relevant range [n, n+l]; otherwise 
the sign of 6X is ambiguous. Ve will assume away cases where this 
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ambiguity arises and hence work with sign x'(n) directly. It is 
essentially this single-signedness assumption, which one can check, that 
underlies the common continuous treatment of discrete variables (or 
parameters) in problems of the present sort. 
At the equilibrium point (di , Qi)' by applying the implicit 
function theorem and by allowing n to be continuous, we obtain the 
ad. aQ. ad. aQ. 
following relations for the magnitudes of changes ~, ~, ~, ~, 
ad. aQ. 
~, and ~ with respect to an infinitesimal increase in inventory 
holding cost h, the setup cost K, and the number of competing sellers n. 
Let Fl and F2 denote the left hand sides of equilibrium conditions (10) 
and (11) respectively. From the assumption that the second order 
condition (7) is satisfied, the determinant of the Hessian matrix is 
positive. It can be easily verified that this implies the determinant of 
Jacobian of Fl and F2 with respect to di and Qi (shown in the left hand 
sides of (29)- (31» is also positive, satisfying a condition necessary 
for applying the implicit function theorem. Finally, for the inverse 
demand and cost quantities, p(.), p'(.), p"(.), C(.), C'(·), and 
C"(.), the arguments ndi and Qi are suppressed for more comprehensible 
presentation. Then, we have: 
[ ~ aQ. 1 
on 
= [ -~ I aF2 
- on 
(29) 
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8F1 ar! I [~ I [- t I 00- oq-; 1 1 8F2 8F2 8Q. = 8F2 1 
on. oq-; or - or 1 1 
(30) 
[ ar! ~!l [~ I [ -t I on. oq-; 1 1 8F2 8F2 8Q. = 8F2 1 
00- oq; 7Jil - 7Jil 1 1 
(31) 
8F1 8Ft 8F2 8F2 
where 0Uj' ~ (= 0Gi ), and Oijf are calculated to be np"di + (n+l)p', 
(K + C - QiC')/Q~, and di(-Q~C" - 2(K + C - QiC'»/Qr respectively 
. 8Ft 8F2 8F1 8F2 8F1 8F2 
whIle on-' on-' or' or' on-' and on- are calculated to be 0, -1/2, 
-l/Qi' di/Qi, ((8p'/Bn)di +(8p/Bn», and 0 respectively. 
The inverse of the Jacobian matrix exists since its determinant is 
nonzero. Hence, we solve the systems of equations (29)-(31) for the 
8d. 8Q. 8d. 8Q. 8d. 8Q. III lId 1 f 
magnitudes of changes on-' on-' or' or' on-' an on- as ollows. 
In the following derivations, the quantity G is defined to be the 
inverse of the determinant of the Jacobian matrix in the left hand sides 
. 8F1 8F2 [8F1] 2 of (29)- (31). l.e., l/G = E 01[ - 01[ . Then, we have: 
1 1 1 
[ ~ 8Q. 1 
on 
[ ~l 8Q. 1 
or 
= G 
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[ ~ = G 8F~ - 7Jl[ 0 8Fl I [ I ~: 1/2 - 7J(f; 
1 
= G 
(Q.C' - K - C)/(2Q~) I 1 1 
(np11d i + (n+l)p/)/2 
[ 
8F2 - 8F
1 I [ l/Q. I 
z G ~:I 12 
- ~ ~ -d.fQ. (lU. (lU, 1 1 
1 1 
di(-QICII - (K + C - QiC/»/Qf I 
(QiC' - K - C)/Q~ - (npl'di + (n+l)p/)di /QI 
[ 
8F2 - aF
1 I [ -«apl /fJn)d.+(ap/fJn» I Ol[" 7Jl[ 1 
1 1 
= G 8F2 aF1 
-oa: E 0 
1 1 
(32) 
(33) 
(34) 
(35) 
(36) 
- di(-Q~CII - 2(K + C - QiC/»«DpI/fJn)di+(Dp/fJn» I 
(37) 
(K + C - QiC/)«apl/fJn)di+(ap/fJn»/Q~ 
ad. aQ. ad. aQ. ad. aQ. 
Th d· d' t' f 1 1 1 lId I e eorrespon lng lree Ions 0 on' 00-' or' or' on-' an on-
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are summarized in the following proposition (see Appendix A for the 
proof) . 
Proposition 1: lssume that the sales quantity per unit time and order 
quantity per cycle (di , Qi) satisfy the equilibrium conditions (10) and 
(11) and the second order sufficient condition (7). lssume further that 
for the cost and the inverse demand functions, C'(Q) > 0, C"(Q) ~ 0, 
p'(d) < 0 and p"(d) S O. loreover, assume that the profit level at (di , 
Qi) is positive. 
ad. aQ. 
Then, 1) ~ < 0 and ~ < 0, 
ad. aQ. 
) 1 1 2 ar- < 0 and ~ > 0, 
ad. aQ. 
d ) 1 d 1 an 3 on- < 0 an on- < O. 
The economic implications of Proposition 1 are as follows. In the 
equilibrium, if the inventory holding cost is increased by a small 
amount, then the sales quantity per unit time as veIl as the order 
quantity per cycle will decrease for seller i, i = 1, "', n. Figure 1 
depicts the resulting changes in inventory levels over time after a 
small increase in the inventory holding cost. Ve note that the change in 
the frequency of ordering is indeterminate (i.e., the corresponding 
cycle length may be shorter or longer than before the change). Also, in 
the equilibrium, if the setup cost is increased by a small amount, then 
the sales quantity per unit time will decrease vhile the order quantity 
per cycle viII increase for seller i, i = 1, "', n. Figure 2 represents 
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the resulting change in inventory levels over time after a small 
increase in the setup cost. Ve note that the change in the frequency of 
ordering is decreased (i.e., the corresponding cycle length is longer 
than before the change). Finally, under the aforementioned 
single-signedness assumption, we conclude that if the number of 
competing sellers increases by a small number, the sales quantity per 
unit time as well as the order quantity per cycle will decrease in 
equilibrium. Figure 3 depicts resulting changes in inventory levels over 
time after a small increase in the number of competing sellers. Ve note 
that the change in the frequency of ordering is indeterminate (i.e., the 
corresponding cycle length may be longer or shorter.). The sensitivity 
results shown in the proposition also implies that, insofar as the 
directions of changes in equilibrium are concerned, the impacts of 
competition on the equilibrium are analogous to those of inventory 
holding cost on the equilibrium, but not to those of setup cost on the 
equilibrium. 
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5. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS UNDER BERTRAND IODEL 
In this section, we investigate the sensitivity of the price p. and 
1 
the order quantity per cycle Qi in equilibrium with respect to the given 
parameters of the Bertrand model depicted in section 3, the inventory 
holding cost h, the setup cost K, and the number of competing sellers n. 
As discussed in section 4, we will treat the number of competing sellers 
n (n ~ 1) as a continuous variable. (see section 4 for details) 
At the equilibrium point (Pi' Qi)' by applying the implicit 
function theorem and by allowing n to be continuous, we will obtain the 
Bp. oQ. Bp. 8Q. 
following relations for the magnitudes of changes ~, ~, ~, ~, 
Bp. 8Q. 
~, and ~ with respect to an infinitesimal increase in inventory 
holding cost h, the setup cost K, and the number of competing sellers n 
as follows. 
Let E1 and E2 denote the left hand sides of equilibrium conditions 
(24) and (26) respectively. From the assumption that the profit 
or. 
expressions (15) and (16) are concave in Pi and Qi' ~ ~ 0 in the 
1 
equilibrium. For the successful application of the implicit function 
or. 
theorem, we will further assume that ~ > 0 in the equilibrium (see 
1 
e.g., Chiang [3]). Under this assumption, it can be easily verified that 
the determinant of Jacobian of E1 and E2 with respect to p. and Q. 
1 1 
(shown in the left hand sides of (38)-(40)) is strictly negative. Since 
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the determinant of the Jacobian is nonzero, an inverse matrix exists. 
Finally, for the demand and cost quantities, d(.), d'(,), C(·), C'(.), 
and C"('), the arguments Pi and Qi are suppressed for more 
comprehensible presentation. Then, ~e have: 
[ DEI DEI I [; I [- t I up; Ol[" 1 1 BE2 BE2 = BE2 (38) up; Ol[" - on 
1 1 
BEl ~ll [~ I [- ~ I up; orr; 1 1 BE2 BE2 = BE2 (39) up; orr; - or 
1 1 
[ ~1 ~ll [; I [- t I up; orr; 1 1 BE2 BE2 = BE2 (40) op; orr; - Oil 
1 1 
BEl BEl BE2 oE2 ~here GP;' orr; , up; , and ~ are calculated to be din + (d'/n) (Pi - (K + 
III 1 
C)/Q.), 0, (d'/n)(K + C - Q.C')/Q~, and (d/n)(-Q~C" - 2(K + C-III 1 
, 3 . . BEl BE2 BEl BE2 BEl oE2 QiC »/Qi respectIvely ~hIle on' on' or' ox-' Oil' and Oil are 
calculated to be - Qi/2, -1/2, -d/ (nQi)' d/ (nQI), - (d/n2)(Pi - (K + 
C)/Qi), and - (d/n2)(K + C - QiC')/QI respectively. 
Ve no~ solve the systems of equations (38)-(40) for the magnitudes of 
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Up. 8Q. Up. 8Q. Up. 8Q. 
h Ill 11 1 f ' c anges on-' on-' ox-' OX-' 00-' and 00- as ollows. Let H denote the 
inverse of the determinant of the Jacobian matrix in the left hand sides 
of (38)- (40) . 
[; I 
[
Up. 
::: 
= H 
[
Up. 
:: 
i.e., l/H = 8E
l 8E2 BEl BE2 Then, we have: up; 01[" - 01[" up; . 
1 1 1 1 
[~2 ~1 Q./2 01[-01[" 1 
1 1 
= H BE2 DEl 
-up; up; 1/2 
1 1 
= H [ (d/n)(-Q~C" - 2(1 + C - QiC'))/(2Q~) I 
d/(2n) 
[ ~2 BEl [ d/(nQi) I 01[" - oq; = H DE~ 1 8El 
- d/(nQ~) 
- up; up; 
1 1 
d2 (- Q~C" - 2(1 + C - QiC'))/(n2Qi) 
-d(d + d'(Pi - C'))/(n2Q~) 
[ ~2 DEl [ d(Pi - (K + C)/Qi)/n2 I 01[" - 01[" H BE~ 1 = BEl QiC')/(n2Q~) - up; UP.; d(1 + C -1 1 
(41) 
(42) 
(43) 
(44) 
(45) 
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8p. OQ. 8p. OQ. 8p. OQ. 
Th d· d· . f 1 1 1 1 1 d 1 e correspon Ing lrectlons 0 on-' on-' ~, ~, on-' an on-
are summarized in the following proposition (see Appendix B for the 
proof). 
Proposition 2: 1ssume that the per unit price and order quantity per 
cycle (Pi' Qi) satisfy the equilibrium conditions (24) and (26). issume 
further that for the cost and the demand functions, C,(·) > 0, C,,(.) ~ 
0, d'(,) < O. 6oreover, assume that the profit level is non-negative and 
ar. 
~ > 0 at (p., Q.). v¥~ 1 1 1 
8p. OQ. 
Then, 1) ~) 0 and ~ < 0; 
8p. 
2) ~) 0 while 
OQ. 
~ ) 0 if d + d'(Pi - C') > 0, 
OQ. 
~ = 0 if d + d'(Pi - C') = 0, 
OQ. 
and ~ < 0 if d + d'(Pi - C') < 0; 
8p. ~. 
) 11 3 on- > 0 and on- < O. 
The economic implications of Proposition 2 are as follows. In the 
equilibrium, if the inventory holding cost is increased by a small 
37 
amount, then the per unit price will increase while the order quantity 
per cycle will decrease for seller i, i = 1, "', n. The sign of the 
corresponding change in the sales quantity per unit time for the entire 
market (i.e., d(Pi» will be negative since d(Pi) is strictly monotone 
decreasing in Pi' Hence, the sign of the corresponding change in the 
sales quantity per unit time for seller i (i.e., d(Pi)/n) will also be 
negative. That is, the sales quantity per unit time for seller i will 
decrease if the inventory holding cost is increased by a small amount. 
In section 4, under the Cournot behavioral assumption, the sales 
quantity per unit time for seller i as well as the order quantity per 
cycle decrease if the inventory holding cost is increased by a small 
amount. Furthermore, the sign of the corresponding change in the per 
unit price (i.e., p(ndi ) in section 4 where di denotes the sales 
quantity per unit time for seller i) will be positive since p(ndi ) is 
strictly monotone decreasing in di • That is, the per unit price will 
increase if the inventory holding cost is increased by a small amount. 
Therefore, we conclude that the directions of changes with respect to 
the inventory holding cost are identical for both Bertrand and Cournot 
models. 
Also, in the equilibrium, if the setup cost is increased by a small 
amount, then the per unit price will increase for seller i, i = 1, "', 
n. On the other hand, the order quantity per cycle will increase, remain 
the same, or decrease for seller i, i = 1, "', n, depending upon the 
conditions (in terms of d(Pi)' d'(Pi)' Pi' and C'(Qi» given in the 
proposition. The sign of the corresponding change in the sales quantity 
38 
I 
per unit time for the entire market (i.e., d(Pi)) viII be negative since 
d(Pi) is strictly monotone decreasing in Pi. Bence, the sign of the 
corresponding change in the sales quantity per unit time for seller i 
(i.e., d(Pi)/n) viII also be negative. That is, the sales quantity per 
unit time for seller i viII decrease if the setup cost is increased by a 
small amount. In section 4, under the Cournot behavioral assumption, 
sales quantity per unit time for seller i viII decrease vhile the order 
quantity per cycle viII increase if the setup cost is increased by a 
small amount. Furthermore, the sign of the corresponding change in the 
per unit price (i.e., p(ndi ) in section 4) viII be positive since p(ndi ) 
is strictly monotone decreasing in di . That is, the per unit price viII 
increase if the setup cost is increased by a small amount. Therefore, ve 
conclude that the directions of changes in the per unit price and the 
sales quantity per unit time for seller i vith respect to the setup cost 
are identical for both Bertrand and Cournot models vhile the direction 
of change in the order quantity per cycle for the Bertrand model may be 
different from the direction of change for the Cournot model. 
Finally, under the aforementioned single-signedness assumption, ve 
conclude that if the number of competing sellers increases by a small 
number, the per unit price will increase vhile the order quantity per 
cycle will decrease in equilibrium for seller i = 1, .•• , n. The sign of 
the corresponding change in the sales quantity per unit time for the 
entire market (i.e., d(Pi)) viII be negative since d(Pi) is strictly 
monotone decreasing in Pi. Let us denote the new sales quantity per unit 
A A 
time for the entire market by d (d < d(Pi)) and the new number of 
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A 
competing sellers by n (n > n). Then, the corresponding new sales 
A 
d(Pi) 
quantity per unit time for seller i is given by A • It can be easily 
n 
d(Pi) d(Pi) 
seen that ~ < ---n---. That is, the sales quantity per unit time for 
n 
seller i will decrease if the number of competing sellers is increased 
by a small number. In section 4, under the Cournot- behavioral 
assumption, sales quantity per unit time for seller i as well as the 
order quantity per cycle decrease if the number of competing sellers is 
increased by a small number. The sign of the corresponding change in the 
per unit price (i.e., p(ndi ) in section 4), however, is indeterminate 
A 
due to the following reason. Let di (di < di ) denote the new sales 
A 
quantity per unit time for seller i and let n (n > n) denote the new 
number of competing sellers. Then, the corresponding new per unit price 
A A A 
is given by p = p(ndi ). Since n > n and di < di , the sign of p(ndi ) -
p(ndi ) is indeterminate. i.e., the per unit price may increase, remain 
the same, or decrease when the number of competing sellers increase by a 
small number. Therefore, we conclude that the directions of changes in 
the sales quantity per unit time for seller i and the order quantity per 
cycle with respect to the setup cost are identical for both Bertrand and 
Cournot models while the direction of change in the per unit price for 
the Bertrand model may be different from the direction of change for the 
Cournot model. 
The sensitivity results shown in the proposition imply that, 
insofar as the directions of changes in equilibrium are concerned, the 
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impacts of competition on the equilibrium are analogous to those of 
inventory holding cost on the equilibrium, but may not be analogous to 
those of setup cost on the equilibrium. Ve further note that the 
oq. Op. 
directions of changes except those of ~ and ~ are identical for both 
Bertrand and Cournot models. i.e., the directions of changes (except 
OQ. Op. 
those of ~ and ~) are insensitive to either of the two behavioral 
(Bertrand and Cournot) assumptions. 
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6. CONCLlJDING BUAUS 
In this paper we extended the theory of competitive inventory 
policies to the case of a symmetric oligopoly under a Cournot-like 
behavioral assumption and a Bertrand-like behavioral assumption. First, 
in section 2 and 3, we showed how a profit maximizing EOQ model can be 
formulated for n identical sellers competing for the same potential 
buyers. From this formulation, symmetric equilibrium conditions were 
obtained. From these equilibrium conditions and the subsequent 
sensitivity analysis, following economic relations are derived. 
In the Cournot model symmetric equilibrium, 
1) given a fixed number of competitors n, as the demand becomes more 
elastic, the equilibrium price gets closer to the average production 
cost; 
2) given a fixed level of elasticity f, as the number of competitors 
increases, the price gets closer to the average production cost; 
3) the average production cost is equal to the sum of the marginal 
production cost and the average inventory holding cost; 
4) if the inventory holding cost is increased by a small amount, the 
sales quantity per unit time and the order quantity per cycle will 
decrease; 
5) if the setup cost is increased by a small amount, the sales quantity 
per unit time will decrease while the order quantity per cycle will 
increase; 
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6) if the number of competing seller is increased by a small number, the 
sales quantity per unit time and the order quantity per cycle will 
decrease. 
It can be easily verified that when n = 1, the EOQ model is analogous to 
a monopolist's profit maximizing EOQ model insofar as the equilibrium 
conditions and subsequent sensitivity analysis are concerned. Moreover, 
when n = 1 and the sales quantity per unit time is constant, the EOQ 
model is analogous to the traditional EOQ model insofar as the 
equilibrium conditions and subsequent sensitivity analysis are 
concerned. 
In the Bertrand model symmetric equilibrium, 
1) the price is equal to the sum of the per unit production cost and the 
per unit inventory holding cost while the per unit production cost is 
equal to the sum of the marginal production cost and the per unit 
inventory holding cost; 
2) if the inventory holding cost is increased by a small amount, the per 
unit price will increase while the order quantity per cycle will 
decrease; 
3) if the setup cost is increased by a small amount, the per unit price 
will increase while the order quantity per cycle will increase, 
remain the same, or decrease, depending upon the conditions given in 
the Proposition 2; 
4) if the number of competing seller is increased by a small number, the 
per unit price will increase while the order quantity per cycle will 
decrease; 
43 
5) insofar as the directions of changes are concerned, the impacts of 
Bertrand competition on the equilibrium are analogous to those of the 
inventory holding cost, but may not be analogous to those of the 
setup cost; 
8Q. Dp. 
6) the directions of changes except those of ~ and ~ are insensitive 
to either of the tvo behavioral (Bertrand and Cournot) assumptions. 
It can be easily verified that vhen n = 1, the EOQ model is analogous to 
a monopolist's profit maximizing EOQ model insofar as the optimality 
conditions (19) and (20) are concerned. Moreover, vhen n = 1 and the per 
unit price is constant, the EOQ model is analogous to the traditional 
EOQ model insofar as the optimality condition (20) is concerned. 
The EOQ model developed in this paper is applicable for broad 
classes of convex cost function C(·) and concave inverse demand function 
p(.). Our models relate to general practices since numerous industries 
and firms apply EOQ based decision making under competition. There are 
several possible extensions that viII further improve the relevance of 
our model to general practices. They include incorporation of more 
sophisticated features such as quantity discount price schedules, finite 
production rates, shortages, delivery lags, and promotional (e.g., 
advertising) effects as veIl as stochastic demand rates. 
From the perspective of game theory, both Cournot Model and 
Bertrand model in this paper can be considered as only an initial step 
tovard better understanding of competitive inventory policies. It is our 
hope that more sophisticated equilibrium concepts of game theory (e.g., 
subgame perfect equilibrium for sequential decisions) viII be exploited 
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in the future research on the competitive inventory policies. 
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APPENDll A: PlOOf Of PlOPoSITIoJf 1 
Ve note that the sales quantity per unit time and order quantity 
per cycle (di , Qi) satisfy the equilibrium conditions (10) and (11) and 
the second order sufficient condition (7) as assumed in Proposition 1. 
Ve also note that C/(·) > 0, C"(·) ~ 0, p/(.) < 0, and p,,(.) ~ 0 while 
G (defined in section 3) is strictly positive. Moreover, the profit 
level at (di , Qi) is assumed to be positive. Finally, we note that, for 
p(.), p/(.), p,,(.), C(·), C/(·), and C,,(·), the arguments ndi and Qi 
are suppressed. Before we prove Proposition 1, we present the following 
lemma. 
Lemma 1. Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, the following 
relations hold. 
1) 
2) 
3) 
p - (K + C)/Qi = 
(K + C - QiC/)/Qi 
-p/d. > hQ./(2d.) 
III
-p/d. 
1 
= hQi/(2di) 
Proof of Lemma 1. By rearranging the equilibrium conditions (10) and 
(11), we obtain the relations 1) and 2), i.e., 
p - (K + C)/Q i = -p/di 
(K + C - QiC/)/Qi = hQi/(2di) 
(A.l) 
(A.2) 
For relation 3), we note first that the profit relation is 
given by (from (1) at di + d_ i = ndi ) pdi - (K + C)di/Qi - hQi/2. Since 
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the profit is assumed to be positive in the equilibrium for seller i = 
1, "', n, 'We have 
p (I + C)/Q i > hQ./(2d.) 1 1 (A.3) 
i.e., per unit revenue - per unit production cost> per unit inventory 
cost. 
By substituting (A.l) into (A.3), 'We obtain 
-p'di > hQi/(2di) 
o 
Proof of Proposition 1. Let us first consider relations 1) of 
ad. aQ. 
Proposition 1, ~ < 0 and ~ < O. From equations (33), 
(A.4) 
ad. 2 ~ = G (QiC' - 1 - C)/(2Qi) (A.5) 
From equation (14), 'We have QiC' - K - C < O. Since G > 0 and Qi > 0, 'We 
ad. 
have ~ < O. 
Also from equations (33), 
aQ. 
~ = G (np"di + (n+1)p')/2 
o 
aQ. 
Since p' < 0 and p" ~ 0, np"di + (n+1)p' < O. Hence, ~ < O. 
o 
(A.6) 
ad. aQ. 
Let us no'W consider relations 2) of Proposition 1, ~ < 0 and ~ > O. 
From equations (35), 
W. 2 4 ~ = G di(-QiC" - (K + C - QiC'))/Qi (A.7) 
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Since C" ~ ° and K + C - QiC/) 0, -Q~CII - (K + C - QiC/) < 0. 
ad. 
1 Hence, or- < 0. 
o 
Also from equations (35), 
aQ. 3 2 or = G «QiC' - K - C)/Qi - (np"di + (n+l)p')di /Qi) (A.8) 
aQ. or>OH 
-(np"di + (n+l)p/)di ) (K + C - QiC')/Qi (A.9) 
By substituting (A.2) of Lemma 1 into the right hand side of (A.9), we 
obtain 
- (np/di + (n+l)p/)di ) hQi/(2di) 
As for the left hand side of (A.9) (or (A.l0», we have 
-(np/di + (n+l)p')di ) -p'di 
since p" ~ 0, p' < 0, and n ~ 1. 
Also, by (A.4) of Lemma 1, we have 
-p'di > hQi/(2di) 
aQ. 
1 From (A.l0)- (A.12), (A.9) holds. Hence, or- ) 0. 
(A.l0) 
(A.ll) 
(A.12) 
o 
ad. aQ. 
Finally, let us consider relations 3) of Proposition 1, ~ < ° and ~ 
< O. 
From equations (37), 
~ = -G d.(-Q~C" - 2(K + C - Q,C'»«Op'/On)d.+(Op/an»/Q~ 
un 1 1 1 1 1 
(A.13) 
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Since C" ~ 0, K + C - QiC' > 0, p" ~ 0, and p' < 0, 
(-QIC" - 2(1 + C - QiC'»«Op'/Bn)di+(Op/Dn» > 0. 
ad. 
1 Hence, on- < 0. 
Also from equations (37), 
o 
~. 2 ~ = G (K + C - QiC')«Op'/Dn)di+(Op/Dn»/Qi (A.14) 
aQ. 
Since K + C - QiC' > 0, p" ~ 0, and p' < 0, ~ < 0 follows. 
o 
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lJp. 
Let us first consider relations 1) of Proposition 1, ~ > 0 and 
oQ. 
~ < o. From equations (42), 
lJp. 2 2 OFf = H (d/n)(-QiC" - 2(K + C - QiC'»/(2Qi) (B.l) 
From equation (28), we have K + C - QiC' > O. Since C" ~ 0, 
2 or. 
-Q.C" - 2(K + C - Q.C') < 0 while H < 0 by the assumption that ~. > O. 
1 1 VPi 
lJp. 
Therefore, ~ > o. 
Also from equations (42), 
oQ. OFf = H d/(2n) 
oQ. 
Since H < 0, we have OFf < o. 
o 
(B.2) 
o 
lJp. 
Let us now consider relations 2) of Proposition 1. i.e., ~ > 0 while 
oQ. aQ. aQ. ~ ) 0 if d + d'(Pi - e') > 0; ~ = 0 if d + d'(Pi - e') = 0; ~ < 0 
if d + d'(p, - e') < o. From equations (44), 
1 
~ = H d2(-Q~e" - 2(K + C - Q.e'»)/(n2Q~) 
UA 1 1 1 
(B.3) 
2 lJp. 
Since -Q.e" - 2(K + e - Q.e') < 0 and H < 0, ~ > O. 
1 1 UA 
o 
Also from equations (44), 
aQ. 2 2 or = H [ - d (d + d' (p i - C'») / (n Q i ) ] (B.4) 
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H(-d) ) o. Therefore, if d + d'(Pi - C') 
if d + d' (p i - C') 
if d + d' (Pi - C') 
oq. 
) 0, then ~ ) 0; 
oq. 
1 
= 0, then or- = 0; 
oq. 
1 < 0, then or- < O. 
o 
Op. oq. 
Finally, let us consider relations 3) of Proposition 1, ~ > 0 and ~ 
< o. 
From equations (46), 
~ = H d2(-Q~C" -
Since - Q~CII - 2(K + C -
1 
2(K + C - QiC'»(Pi - (K + C)/Qi)/(n3Q~) (B.5) 
Op. 
QiC') < 0 and Pi - (K + C)/Qi ) 0, ~ > O. 
Also from equations (46), 
~ = H d2(K + C - QiC')/(n3QI) 
OQ. 
Since K + C - QiC' ) 0, ~ < 0 follows. 
o 
(B.6) 
o 
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VITB OPTIONS TO llEDUCE SETUP AND INVENTORY HOLDING COSTS 
Cheng-lang Chen and I. Jo lin 
Iova State University 
ABSTUCT 
In this paper, the profit maximizing economic order quantity (EOQ) model 
is extended to the case of a symmetric oligopoly consisting of several 
producers who compete with each other for the same potential buyers. For 
each producer, we assume that the options of investing in reducing the 
setup and inventory holding costs are available. A primary goal of this 
paper is to understand economic implications of the resulting 
equilibrium in terms of critical elements of EOQ models such as the 
setup and inventory holding costs as well as critical elements of the 
micro economic market theory such as the market price and the number of 
competing producers. For an example, we present a unique insight as to 
why several Japanese and American producers are striving to reduce the 
setup costs under ever increasing competition. SpeCifically, it will be 
shown that, for a profit maximizing producer, as the number of competing 
producers increases, his optimal strategy dictates that he reduce his 
setup and inventory holding costs. 
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1. INTlODUCTION 
This paper extends the profit maximizing economic order quantity 
(EOQ) model with a constant demand rate over time to the case of a 
symmetric oligopoly consisting of producers of a single homogeneous 
product who co~ete with each other for the same potential buyers. Ve 
assume that, for each producer, the options of investing in reducing the 
setup and inventory holding costs are available. A primary goal of this 
study is to understand economic implications of the resulting 
equilibrium in terms of critical elements of EOQ models such as the 
sales quantity per unit time and the levels of setup and inventory 
holding costs as well as critical elements of the microeconomic market 
theory such as the market price and the number of competing producers. 
For an example, we offer a unique insight as to why several Japanese and 
American producers are striving to reduce the setup costs under ever 
increasing competition. Specifically, it will be shown that, for a 
profit maximizing producer, as the number of competing producers 
increases (i.e., the competition gets more intense), his optimal 
strategy dictates that he reduce his setup and inventory holding costs. 
The idea of employing profits as a performance measure of EOQ type 
models has been explored as early as the 1950's (see, e.g., Vhitin [29] 
or Smith [23]). Ladany and Sternlieb [11] not only uses the profit 
levels as the performance measure, but also provides inSights on 
relations among price, cost, and demand by making the demand dependent 
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on the price and the price dependent on the cost and a fixed mark-up. 
Brahmbhatt and Jaisval [3] extends the previous model by incorporating 
variable mark-up as a function of a capital intensity measure and by 
maximizing profit over the order quantity and the capital intensity. 
Arcelus and Srinivasan [1] also extends Ladany and Sternlieb [11] by 
treating demand as a function of price, price as a function of a 
variable mark-up rate times a unit cost under profit maximization over 
the order quantity and the variable mark-up rate. loreover, lonahan [16] 
as veIl as Lal and Staelin [12] developed quantity discount schemes for 
the seller. Lee and Rosenblatt [13] extended lonahan [16] by 
incorporating more realistic features (e.g., constraints imposed on the 
amount of discount that can be offered). The rationale for the quantity 
discount in these papers is the cost savings resulting from coordination 
of producers' production quantities and buyers' order quantities under 
the assumption that both buyers as veIl as sellers are EOQ based 
decision makers. The assumption that buyers are EOQ based decision 
makers is relaxed in a nev quantity discount EOQ model in Hin [14]. In 
Min [14], the rationale for the quantity discount is the seller'S 
exploitation of the heterogeneous preferences of the buyers regarding 
their purchase sizes. More recently, in lin [15], for both uniform 
pricing and quantity discount pricing (under the heterogeneous buyers' 
preferences assumption) cases, how to incorporate competition aspects of 
sellers into EOQ models based on Cournot-like behavioral assumptions 
(see e.g., Oren, Smith, and Vilson [17] or Varian [28] or Friedman [6]) 
is discussed. 
58 
Also, under the assumption of dynamic and deterministic demands, 
there have been numerous studies investigating the optimal relations of 
production schedules, prices, and inventories (see e.g., Gaimon [7], 
Pekelman [18], Kunreuther and Schrage [10], and Thomas [26]). Thomas 
[27] investigates the optimal relations of production quantities and 
prices under the assumption of stochastic demands. Moreover, in Gaimon 
[8], the assumption of a single firm is replaced by a duopoly, and the 
optimal relations bet~een production capacities and prices are studied 
~ithin a differential game frame~ork. Also, in Dockner and Jorgensen 
[5], optimal pricing strategy under competition is examined and 
non-cooperative as ~ell as cooperative equilibria results are obtained. 
In Teng and Thompson [25], an oligopoly model is analyzed and optimal 
advertising policies are obtained ~hen production costs obey a learning 
curve. Ve note that the models constructed and analyzed in the last 
three papers are also time dependent dynamic models. 
Recently, the superiority of an inventory management system called 
Zero Inventory (often synonymous ~ith Kanban and Just-in-Time; see e.g., 
Zang~ill [30]) has attracted a great deal of attention not only from 
industries but also from academia. The essential philosophy of Zero 
Inventory management system is that the inventory results from 
operational inefficiencies. Hence, the higher the level of inventory, 
the greater the operational inefficiency. From this perspective, it is 
~ell known that several Japanese and American producers strive to reduce 
the level of inventory as much as possible. In order to reduce the 
level of inventory, numerous experts in industries and academia find it 
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essential to reduce the setup cost of production. In Porteus [19], such 
efforts to reduce the setup cost are mathematically incorporated by 
introducing an investment cost function of reducing the setup cost to 
undiscounted EOQ models. For the cases of logarithmic investment cost 
functions and power investment cost functions, his models demonstrate 
decreased operational costs when the setup cost is reduced. Porteus 
[20] extends Porteus [19] to the cases of discounted EOQ models. 
Billington [2] formulates a model of which setup cost is a function of 
capital expenses and investigates the relations among holding, setup, 
and capital expenses. In Zangwill [30], however, it is argued via 
numerical examples that certain efforts to reduce the setup cost will 
actually increase the operational costs. We note that, in all these 
papers, the performance criterion has been the minimization of 
operational costs (as compared to the maximization of profits in our 
model) and the competition effects on the production and inventory 
policies are ignored. 
In this paper, we construct a model under a Cournot-like behavioral 
assumption. That is, each producer first predicts his competitors' 
sales quantities per unit time in maximizing his own profit (see e.g., 
Oren, Smith, and Wilson [17]). The decision variables of our model are 
the economic production quantity (in order to be consistent with the 
term "producer", we will use the term "economic production quantity" in 
place of "economic order quantity"), the sales quantity per unit time, 
and the desired levels of setup and inventory holding costs (i.e., the 
options of investing in reducing setup and inventory holding costs are 
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available to each producer). In our model, we will assume that all 
critical economic quantities producers must determine such as the 
optimal economic production quantity and the optimal level of the setup 
cost are made under the framework of static decision making (cf. dynamic 
decision making framework; see e.g. [7], [18], [10],and [26]). In order 
to highlight the optimal relations among the critical economic 
quantities that are derived under the static decision making framework, 
we will make the following assumptions. Ve assume : 1) the demand is 
deterministic and constant over time; 2) production occurs 
instantaneously; 3) there is no learning effects in setup or production. 
Also we will not consider discounting prices and costs over time and 
other time dependent features such as promotion and advertising. In 
addition, we will assume that each producer can produce sufficient 
amount of products to meet any quantity demanded by buyers. Under these 
assumptions, we formulate a Cournot model consisting of a symmetric 
oligopoly of n producers with options to invest in reducing setup and 
inventory holding costs offering a homogeneous product. By a symmetric 
oligopoly, we mean producers are identical in all economic respects such 
as production costs and investment costs of reducing setup and inventory 
holding costs. From the formulation of the Cournot model, we obtain a 
symmetric equilibrium. The formulation and equilibrium conditions under 
the Cournot model explicitly depend on n, the number of competing 
producers in the market. Ve derive interesting economic implications 
regarding the market price, demand elasticity, number of competitors, 
average and marginal costs of production and inventory holding as well 
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as the aforementioned four decision variables. Furthermore, via 
sensitivity analysis ~hich is based on the equilibrium conditions under 
the Cournot model, ~e derive the directions and magnitudes of changes in 
the aforementioned decision variables ~ith respect to change in the 
number of competing producers. From the results of the sensitivity 
analysis, we present several interesting economic implications including 
a unique insight as to ~hy several Japanese and American producers have 
devoted so much energy and time to reducing setup costs. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, ~e 
formulate the Cournot model and derive and interpret its equilibrium 
conditions. In section 3, ~e perform the sensitivity analysis on the 
Cournot model and interpret its economic implications. Summary and 
concluding remarks are made in section 4. 
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2. THE .UDIt AND ECUNUIIC IIPLICATIONS IN EqUILIBlIUI 
Ve assume that there are n identical producers offering a single 
homogeneous product. Also we assume that buyers have perfect information 
about the per unit prices n producers charge. Hence, in equilibrium, all 
producers will charge the same per unit price, p, the market price. For 
each producer i, i = 1, .•• , n, as in the cases of traditional EOQ 
models (see e.g., Hillier and Lieberman [9]), we assume: 1) the goods 
are produced in equal numbers, Qi at a time; 2) all Qi units arrive 
without delivery lag; 3) no shortage to a buyer is permitted. Ve also 
assume that, for each producer i, the total cost per cycle includes the 
production and inventory holding costs of conventional EOQ models. The 
production cost per cycle is represented by Ki + C(Qi) where Ki is the 
setup cost and C(Q.) is the production cost incurred in producing Q. 
1 1 
units after the setup. On the other hand, the inventory holding cost is 
characterized by h, inventory holding cost per unit per unit time. In 
this paper, the options of investing in reducing the setup cost and the 
inventory holding cost are available. Specifically, we will 
characterize these options by defining the following two cost functions 
(cf. Porteus [19]). 
1) V(KiiKO) : the per unit time cost of reducing the setup cost from the 
current level of KO to the level Ki . 
2) V(hiihO) the per unit time cost of reducing the inventory holding 
cost from the current level of hO to the level of hi. 
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As implied earlier, ~e assumed that all cost functions (i.e., C(Qi)' 
V(Ki;KO) and V(hi;hO» are identical for all producers. Ve further 
assume that C(Q) is strictly increasing and convex in Q and V(Ki; KO) 
and V(hi;hO) are strictly decreasing and concave in K and h, i.e., C'(Q) 
> 0, C"(Q) ~ 0, V'(hi;hO) < 0, V"(hi;hO) ~ 0, V'(Ki;KO) < 0, and 
V"(Ki;KO) ~ O. The convexity of C(Q) implies that the marginal cost of 
production is increasing in Q where as the concavity of V(Ki;KO) 
(V(hi;hO» in Ki (hi) implies that the marginal per unit time cost of 
reducing the setup cost (or inventory holding cost) with respect to the 
setup cost (or inventory holding cost) is decreasing. 
The sales quantity to buyers per unit time for the entire market is 
characterized by d(p), a function of per unit market price p. ie assume 
that the sales quantity, given a price, is constant over time. Also ~e 
assume that the sales quantity function is strictly decreasing in p, 
i.e., d'(p) < 0. Under the monotonicity assumption of d'(p) < 0, the 
inverse function p(d) exists (with p'(d) < 0). The inverse function p(d) 
specifies the price p that clears d units in the market. Ve will assume 
that the inverse function p(d) is concave in d, i.e., p"(d) ~ O. Just 
as in microeconomic theory (see e.g., Varian [28]), we can refer to p(d) 
as the inverse demand function while d(p) as the demand function. Since 
the demand function d(p) is assumed to be constant over time, so is the 
inverse demand function p(d). 
Given the above definitions and assumptions, we develop a 
Cournot-like framework as follows. Ve assume that each producer i, 1 = 
1, '.', n will predict the total sales quantity per unit time of his 
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n-1 competitors, d_ i • Under this prediction, producer i maximizes his 
profit per unit time over his sales quantity per unit time di , economic 
production quantity per cycle Qi , desired setup cost per cycle Ii' and 
desired inventory holding cost per unit per unit time hi. For the total 
sales quantity per unit time for the entire market, d. + d ., the 1 -1 
corresponding per unit market price is given by p(di + d_ i ). Hence, the 
total revenue per cycle for producer i is p(di + d_ i ) Qi. And the 
corresponding total cost per cycle and the cycle length are given by I. 
1 
+ C(Q.) + h.Q~/(2d.) + V(I.;KO)Q·/d. + V(h.;hO)Q·/d. and Q./d. III 1 II III 1 1 
respectively. Given these expressions for the total revenue, cost, and 
the cycle length, the problem of maximizing profit per unit time for 
producer i, r i , can be stated as follo~s. 
(1) 
The first order optimality conditions of the maximization problem (1) 
are 
ar. 
___ 1 = p'(d. + d .)d. + p(d. + d .) - (1.+ C(Q.»)/Q. = 0 (2) ad. 1 - 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 
1 
ari 2 
--- = -d.(C'(Q.)Q. - K.- C(Q.»/Q. - h./2 = 0 (3) aQ. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 
ar. 
___ 1 = -Q.f2 - V' (h. ;ho) = 0 (4) ab. 1 1 
1 
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a'C. 
_1 = -d.jQ. - V'(K.;KO) = 0 aK. 1 1 1 
1 
(5) 
In order to derive the corresponding second order sufficient conditions 
for optimality, we first obtain the second order derivatives of the 
profit as follows. 
2 
a 'C. 
~ = p" ( d. + d .) d. + 2p' (d. + d .) ad~ I-I I 1-1 
1 
2 a 'C. 
1 
= (Ki + C(Qi) - QiC'(Qi»/Q~ 
ad.aQ. 
1 1 
2 a 'C. 
__ 1_ = 0 
ad.ah. 
1 1 
2 a 'C. 
__ 1_ = -l/Qi 
ad.aK. 
I 1 
2 a 'Ci 1 
= - 2 
ah.aQ. 
1 1 
2 a 'C. 2 3 ~ = d.(-Q.C"(Q.) - 2(K. + C(Q.) - Q.C'(Q.»)/Q. aQ~ 1 III III 1 
1 
2 a 'C. d. 
1 1 
-- = --::2" 
aQ.aK. Q. 
1 1 1 
2 a 'C. 
_~l_ = _ V" (hI' ;ho) ah~ 
1 
2 a 'C. 
__ 1_ = 0 
ah.aK. 
1 1 
2 a 'C. 
~ = - V" (K. ;Ko) aK~ 1 
1 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
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From our assumptions that p,(.) < 0 and p,,(.) ~ 0, we have 
2 a 1". 
~ < O. Therefore, the second order sufficient conditions for 
ad. 
1 
optimality can be expressed by the following Hessian matrix and the 
signs of principal minors. 
V1< 0 221 
2 a2 'I . / ad . {)h • 2 a 'li/adi a 'l.j ad . aQ . a 1".f ad . aK . 111 111 111 
V2> 0 
2 2 2 a2 'I . / aQ . h . 2 a 'l.f ad . aQ . a 'l.j aQ . a 'l./aQ.aK. 111 1 1 111 111 
V3< 0 2 2 a2'l. / {)h~ 2 a 1". / ad . {)h • a 'I. /OQ . {)h • a 1".j{)h.OK. 111 111 1 1 111 
V4> 0 
2 2 2 2 2 a 'l.f ad. aK . a 'l./OQ.aK. a 'l.f {)h • aK . a 'l.jaK. 111 111 III 1 1 
( Vi defines the ith principal minor) 
(16) 
Throughout the rest of this paper, we will assume that the second order 
sufficient conditions are satisfied. In addition, we will assume that 
the resulting profit level of each producer i, i = 1, •.. , n, evaluated 
at the optimal sales quantity per unit time and production quantity per 
cycle, desired setup cost per cycle, and desired inventory holding cost 
per unit per unit time is non-negative (i.e., no producer will exit from 
the market). 
So far we have examined the optimality conditions of a single 
producer. Ve now proceed to derive an equilibrium of n producers. 
Under our assumptions of identical producers, there exists a symmetric 
equilibrium (see e.g., Oren, Smith, and Vilson [17]) where 
and 
d1 = d2 = 
Q1 = Q2 = 
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= dn 
= Q n 
(17) 
(18) 
i.e., the sales quantity per unit time as well as the economic 
production quantity are identical for all producers. In this symmetric 
equilibrium, the total sales quantity per unit time from all competitors 
of producer i, d_ i is equal to (n-1)di for i = 1, ••• n. Therefore, the 
corresponding equilibrium conditions of the optimality conditions (2) -
(5) are given by 
p'(nd.)d. + p(nd.) - (K. + C(Q.»jQ. = 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
-d.(C'(Q.)Q. - K. - C(Q.»jQ~ - h.j2 = 0 1 11 1 111 
- Qi/2 - V, (hi ;hO) = 0 
- dijQi - V, (Ki ;KO) = 0 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
Let us first examine equilibrium condition (19). The corresponding 
demand elasticity E, E = p(d)j(p'(d)d) by definition (see e.g., Varian 
[28]), evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium point becomes: 
(23) 
Hence, in the symmetric equilibrium, equation (19) can be restated as 
p(nd.) = ( nE 1 )(K. + C(Q.»jQ. 
1 nE + 1 1 1 (24) 
Equation (24) states that, given a fixed number of competitors n, as the 
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demand becomes more elastic (i.e., If I gets larger), the equilibrium 
price gets closer to the average production cost. Or as the demand gets 
more inelastic (i.e., lEI gets smaller), the equilibrium price gets 
farther a~ay from the average production cost. If ve vie~ the term 
nEn! 1 as a markup rate, the economic implication is that the markup 
rate is larger when the demand is more inelastic. On the other hand, 
given a fixed level of elasticity, E, we observe that as the number of 
competitors increases (i.e., as the competition gets more intense), the 
price gets closer to the average production cost. Or as the number of 
competitors decreases (i.e., as the competition gets less intense), the 
price gets farther away from the average production cost. Ve also 
observe that as the number of competitors decreases, the markup rate 
increases. In addition, we note that if -1 < nE < 0, the price is 
negative. Furthermore if nE = -1, it can be easily verified that no 
production quantity per cycle Qi satisfies equation (19). Hence, 
throughout this paper, we limit our analysis to the cases where nE < -1. 
i.e., nE < -1 ~ill be assumed. 
Let us nov examine equilibrium condition (20). By rearranging 
terms of condition (20), ~e have 
(1 + C(Qi»/Qi - C'(Qi) = hQi/(2di) (25) 
Equilibrium condition (25) states that for each producer i, i = 1, ... , 
n, the average production cost is equal to the sum of the marginal 
production cost and the average inventory cost per unit. The economic 
implication is that the per unit production cost is strictly higher than 
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the per unit inventory cost at the equilibrium since the marginal 
production cost is assumed to be positive. Also we note that if (K + 
C(Qi»/Qi ~ C'(Qi)' it can be easily verified that no production 
quantity per cycle Qi satisfies equation (20). Hence, throughout this 
paper, we limit our analysis to the cases where 
(I + C(Qi»/Qi > C'(Qi)' i.e., (K + C(Qi»/Qi > C'(Qi) will be assumed. 
We now examine equilibrium condition (21). By rearranging terms of 
condition (21), we have 
(26) 
In equation (26), W'(hi;hO) denotes the marginal decrease in the per 
unit time cost of reducing the inventory holding cost (per unit per unit 
time) with respect to a small increase in hi where as Qi/2 represents 
the marginal increase in the per unit time inventory holding cost with 
respect to a small increase in hi. Hence, equation (26) states that, in 
equilibrium, the sum of the marginal decrease in the per unit time cost 
of reducing the inventory holding cost and the marginal increase in the 
per unit time inventory holding cost results in zero. 
We now proceed to examine equilibrium condition (22). By 
rearranging terms of condition (22), we have 
(27) 
In equation (27), V'(Ki;KO) denotes the marginal decrease in the per 
unit time cost of reducing the setup cost with respect to a small 
increase in K. where as d./Q. represents the marginal increase in the 
111 
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per unit time setup cost with respect to a small increase in Ii' Hence, 
equation (27) states that, in equilibrium, the sum of the marginal 
decrease in the per unit time cost of reducing the setup cost and the 
marginal increase in the per unit time inventory holding cost results in 
zero. 
Ve note that the relations among the equilibrium sales quantity per 
unit time di , the economic production quantity Qi , the setup cost per 
cycle Ki and the inventory holding cost per unit per unit time hi for i 
= 1, "', n are implicitly determined by (24) to (27). By simultaneously 
solving conditions (24) to (27) given p(o), C(o), V(o), V(o), ho' Ko and 
n, we can numerically determine the values of di , Qi , Ki' and hio 
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3. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
In this section, we investigate the sensitivity of the sales 
quantity per unit time di , production quantity per cycle Qi , setup cost 
per cycle Ii' and the inventory holding cost per unit per unit time hi 
in equilibrium with respect to the given parameter of our model, the 
number of competing producers n. Our analysis of sensitivity will be 
based on differential calculus (especially the implicit function 
theorem; see e.g., Chiang [4]), which requires variables (or parameters) 
to be continuous, rather than discrete. Hence, it will be necessary to 
treat the number of competing producer n (n ~ 1), which is hitherto 
assumed to be an integer, as a continuous variable. The justification 
for treating n as a continuous variable (to the extent possible) can be 
found in Seade [21]. The justification in Seade [21] is based on an 
essential assumption called the "single-signedness" assumption. That 
is, let us define x(n) to be any relevant function of n (e.g., price p) 
and let Vx = x(n+1) - x(n). Then (sigh Vx) = (sigh x/en»~ is assumed 
(see e.g., Seade [21] for further details). 
At the equilibrium point (di , Qi , hi' Ii)' by applying the implicit 
function theorem and by allowing n to be continuous, we obtain the 
ad. DQ. Oh. aI. 
following relations for magnitudes of changes ~, ~,~, and ~ with 
respect to an infinitesimal increase in the number of competing 
producers n. 
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Let Fl, F2, F3and F4 denote the left hand sides of equilibrium 
conditions (19) to (22) respectively. From the assumptions that the 
second order conditions (16) are satisfied, the determinant of the 
Hessian matrix is positive. It can be easily verified that this implies 
the determinant of Jacobian of Fl, F2, F3 and F4 with respect to di , Qi , 
hi and Ii (shovn in the left hand side of equation (28» is also 
positive, satisfying a condition necessary for applying the implicit 
function theorem. Finally, for the inverse demand and cost quantities, 
p(.), p'(')' p"(')' C(·), C'('), and C"('), the arguments ndi , Qi , hi 
and Ii are suppressed for more comprehensible presentation. Then, we 
have : 
oFl oF1 oF1 OF1 
on; 
1 
(J[[;" 
1 
OIl." 1 or. 1 
oF2 oF2 oF2 OF2 
on. 
1 
(J[[;" 
1 
OIl." 
1 
or. 1 
oF3 oF3 oF3 OF3 
on. 
1 
Ol[ 
1 
OIl." 1 or. 1 
oF4 oF4 oF4 OF4 
on. 
1 
(J[[;" 
1 
OIl." 
1 
or. 
1 
where the elements of equation 
1 !- = nd.p" 
uu. 1 
1 
oF1 oF2 
01[= oa. = 
1 1 
oF1 oF3 
OIl." = E = 0 
1 1 
+ (n + l)p' 
I. + C - Q.C' 
1 1 
Q~ 
1 
ad. 
1 oF1 
7fil - 7fil 
oQ. oF2 1 (28) 7fil - 7fil 
Oh. = 
oF3 1 
7fil - 7fil 
01. 
1 aF4 
on - 7fil 
(28) are as follows. 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) 
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The inverse of the Jacobian matrix exists since its determinant is 
nonzero. Hence, we solve the equation (28) for the magnitudes of 
ad. OQ. OK. alt. 
changes m!-, m!-, m/, and m/ as follows. 
(32) 
(33) 
(34) 
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
(38) 
(39) 
(40) 
In the following derivations, the quantity I is defined to be the 
inverse of the determinant of the Jacobian matrix in the left hand side 
of equation (28). After some matrix operations, we have: 
~ = - I(di~' + ~) [V" (hi ;hO)V" (Ki ;KO)di (- Q~C"- 2 (Ki+C- QiC'» /Q~ 
+ d~V"(hi;hO)/Qt + V"(Ki ;KO)/4 ] (41) 
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~ = I(di~' + ~) (VII (hi;hO)V" (Ii;IO)(Ii+C- QiC'»/Q~ -
V"(hi;hO)di/Q~] (42) 
~ = I(di~ +~) (V"(hi;hO)di(Ii+C-QiC')/Qi 
+ V" (hi ;hO)di (- Q~C"- 2 (Ii +C- Qi C')) /Qi + 1/ (4Qi)] (44) 
ad. aQ. Oh. al. 
Th d· d· . f I I I d I e correspon lng lrectlons 0 on-' on-'on-' an on- are 
summarized in the folloving proposition (see Appendix for the proof). 
Proposition 1: Assume that the saLes quantity per unit time 
,production quantity per cycLe and the levels of setup and inventory 
holding costs (di , Qi , hi' Ii) satisfy the equilibrium conditions (19) 
to (22) and the second order sufficient condition (16). Assume further 
that for the production cost, the investment cost and the inverse demand 
functions, C'(Q) > 0, C"(Q) ~ 0, V'(I) < 0, V'(h) < 0, V"(I) ~ 0, 
V"(h) ~ 0, p'(d) < 0, and p"(d) ~ 0. loreover, assume that the 
profit level at (d., Q., h., I.) is non-negative. 
III 1 
Then, we have : 
ad. aQ. Oh. OK. 
I I I d I on- < 0, on- < 0, on- < ° an on- < 0. 
The economic implications of Proposition 1 are as follows. In the 
equilibrium, under the aforementioned single-signedness assumption, we 
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conclude that if the number of competing producers increases by a 
smaller number, the sales quantity per unit time, the production 
quantity per cycle, the inventory holding cost per unit per unit time 
and the setup cost per cycle will decrease in equilibrium. We note that 
the change in the frequency of production is indeterminate (i.e., the 
corresponding cycle may be longer or shorter). The sign of the 
corresponding change in the per unit price (i.e., p(ndi )), however, is 
A A 
also indeterminate due to the following reason. Let di (di < di ) denote 
A A 
the new sales quantity per unit time for producer i and let n (n > n) 
denote the new number of competing producers. Then, the corresponding 
A 
new per unit price is given by p = p(ndi ). Since n > n and di < di , the 
AA 
sign of p(ndi ) - p(ndi ) is indeterminate. i.e., the per unit price may 
increase, remain the same, or decrease when the number of competing 
producers increased by a small number. 
From the perspective of 
oK. 
costs, the fact that an1 < 
investing in setup and inventory holding 
~. 
o and ~ < 0 in the equilibrium implies 
the following. For a profit maximizing producer, as the number of 
competing producers increases (i.e., the competition gets more intense), 
his optimal strategy dictates that he reduce his setup and inventory 
holding costs. 
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4. CONCLUDING BKlAns 
In this paper, we extended the profit maximizing EOQ model by 
introducing competition aspects under a Cournot-like behavioral 
assumption and by treating the setup cost and inventory holding cost as 
decision variables. First we showed how a profit maximizing EOQ model 
can be formulated for n identical producers competing for the same 
potential buyers. From this formulation, we obtained symmetric 
equilibrium conditions. From these equilibrium conditions and the 
subsequent sensitivity analysis, interesting economic relations are 
obtained. 
From the perspective of Zero Inventory Philosophy, this paper 
provided an additional insight as to why several Japanese and American 
producers strive to reduce the setup cost. That is, as the number of 
competing producers increases (i.e., the competition gets more intense), 
the optimal strategy of a profit maximizing producer dictates that he 
invest in reducing setup and inventory holding costs. 
The EOQ model developed in this paper is applicable for broad 
classes of convex C(.) function, concave V(·) and V(.) functions, and 
concave p(.) function. Our model relates general practices since 
numerous industries and firms apply EOQ based decision making under 
competition. There are several possible extensions that will further 
improve the relevance of our model to general practices. They include 
incorporation of more sophisticated features such as quantity discount 
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price schedules, finite production rates, shortages, delivery lags, and 
promotional (e.g., advertising) effects as well as stochastic demand 
rates. From the perspective of Zero Inventory Philosophy, it would be 
of interest to study the effects of competition on process quality 
improvement and effective capacity in conjunction with the setup cost 
reduction (see e.g., Porteus [21] and Spence and Porteus [24]). 
From the perspective of game theory, Cournot lodel in this paper 
can be considered as only an initial step toward better understanding of 
competitive inventory policies. It is our hope that more sophisticated 
equilibrium concepts of game theory (e.g., subgame perfect equilibrium 
for sequential decisions) will be exploited in the future research on 
the competitive inventory policies. 
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APPENDIX: PlODI' 01' PlOPOSITION 1 
From equation (41), ~e have 
~ =-I(di~)(V"(hi;ho)V"(Ki;Ko)di(-Q~C"-2(Ki+C-QiC'»/Q~ + 
d~V"(hi;hO)/Q1 + V" (Ki;KO)/4 ] (A.1) 
From equation (25), ~e have Ki + C - QiC' ) O. Since C" ~ 0, 
-QiC" - 2(Ki + C - QiC') < 0, V"(hi) < 0 and V"(Ki ) < 0, ~e have 
[ . ] is less than zero. Since (di~ + ~ ) < 0 and I ) 0, 
ad. 
~e obtain ~ < O. 0 
From (42), ~e have 
~ = I(di~~)[V"(hi;ho)V"(KiKO)(Ki+C-QiC'»/Qi -
V"(hi;ho)di/Q~] (A.2) 
From equation (25), ~e have Ki + C - QiC' ) O. Since V"(hi) < 0 
and V/(Ki ) < 0, ~e have [ . ] is less than zero. 
/}p' /Jp aQ. 
Since (di~ + on ) < 0 and I ) 0, we obtain ~ < O. 0 
From (43), we have 
~ = -I(di~'+ ~)[V"(Ki;KO)(Ki+C-QiC')/(2Q~) - di/(2Q~)] 
From equation (25), we have Ki + C - QiC' ) O. Since V"(Ki ) < 0, 
we have [ . ] is less than zero. 
Since (di~ + ~ ) < 0 and I > 0, we obtain ~ < O. o 
(A.3) 
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From (44), we have 
~ = I (di~ + ~) [ V" (hi ;hO)di (- QIC"- (Ki+C- QiC'» /Qi + 1/( 4Qi )] 
(A.4) 
From equation (25), we have Ki + C - QiC' ) O. Since C" ~ 0, 
-QIC" - 2(Ki + C - QiC') < 0, V"(hi ) < 0 , we have[ . ] is greater 
than zero. 
1Jp' IJp OK. 
Since (di~ + on ) < 0 and I > 0, we obtain ~ < O. 0 
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PAPER 3. 
oPTIIAL SELLING QUANTITY AND PURCHASING PRICE FOR INTERlEDIARY FIIlIS 
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OPTIDL SELLING qUANTITY AND PUlC1IA.SING PUCE FOR INTEllIEDIAB.Y FlUS 
Cheng-lang Chen and I. Jo .in 
lava State University 
ABSTRACT 
Intermediary firms are economic agents that purchase from mostly small 
and numerous independent producers and sell to other firms or to the 
public. In this paper, how intermediary firms can optimally determine 
both selling quantity and purchasing price of a product is investigated. 
By incorporating the special structure of intermediary firms' 
environments and by modifying the conventional economic order quantity 
(EOQ) model accordingly, we provide optimal decision rules regarding the 
selling quantity and purchasing price for intermediary firms. 
(Economic Order Quantity, Pricing) 
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INTRODUCTION 
The conventional economic order quantity (EOQ) and economic 
production quantity (EPQ) have been extensively studied and continually 
modified in order to accommodate specific business needs and 
environments1,2. In this paper, we extend the conventional EOQ/EPQ 
models so as to determine the optimal selling quantity and purchasing 
price for an intermediary firm. Ve define an intermediary firm to be an 
economic agent that purchases products from numerous independent 
producers and sells those purchased products to other firms that process 
or utilize the products (or to the public) at a given market price. Such 
firms can be found in numerous industries. For examples, there are 1) 
garment and apparel industry firms that purchase piece works 
("homework") from independent sewers, and 2) agricultural industry firms 
that purchase dairy and other agricultural products from independent 
farmers. 
The objective function employed in this paper is that of profit 
maximization. The idea of employing profits as a performance measure of 
EOQ type models has been explored as early as in the 1950's3. Ladanyand 
Sternlieb4 not only uses the profit levels as the performance measure, 
but also provides insights on relations among price, cost, and demand by 
making the demand dependent on the price and the price dependent on the 
cost. Arcelus and Srinivasan5 extend Ladany and Sternlieb's vork by 
exploring alternative investment oriented performance measures such as 
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return on investment and residual income. Also, we employ the inspection 
cost feature of conventional EOQ/EPQ models6 in order to account for 
possible defective products from independent producers. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first define the 
special structure of intermediary firms' environments and formulate the 
basic profit maximization model over the selling quantity, given a fixed 
purchasing price. Next we extend the basic model by making the fixed 
purchasing price as a variable. Also, we add to the basic model an 
inspection cost component, which is a realistic feature for an 
intermediary firm. Finally, an illustrative example is provided and 
concluding marks are made. 
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DESCRIPTION OF INTEBIEDillY FIDS' ENVIRONIENTS 
Let us denote the unit price an intermediary firm pays to 
independent producers by r for a single type of product (e.g., eggs or 
milk). The annual supply rate of the product to the intermediary firm 
from the independent producers at price r is denoted by s(r). In the 
traditional economic production quantity (EPQ) perspective, s(r) can be 
viewed as the production rate. In this paper, we will assume that the 
annual rate is constant over time and there is a linear relation between 
r and s(r). That is, s(r) = gr, where g is a positive proportionality 
constant. Given a supply proportionality constant g, a higher price r 
implies a higher supply rate s(r). Also given a fixed price r, a higher 
supply proportionality constant g implies a higher supply rate s(r). In 
the basic model, we will assume that the price r is fixed and relax this 
assumption later. The purchased units are stored in the firm at a cost 
of rF per unit per annum where F is the annual holding cost as a 
fraction of unit purchasing cost to the intermediary firms (see e.g., 
Hax and Candea7 for the various components of the inventory holding cost 
and the role of holding cost F). Once an amount of Q units accumulates, 
all Q units are sold to another firm that processes or utilizes the 
products (or to the public) at a given market price of p per unit. The 
cost incurred to the intermediary firm in selling the accumulated 
products is represented by a fixed selling cost K (for arranging 
transportation, etc.) and a variable selling cost c per unit (for actual 
transportation, etc.). 
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BASIC IODEL 
Under our definitions and assumptions, the revenue per cycle is 
given by pQ while the payment to the independent producers per cycle is 
given by rQ. The total selling cost per cycle is K + cQ and the 
inventory holding cost per cycle is rFQ2/(2s(r». Therefore, the profit 
per cycle, PRC, which is the revenue less the cost, is given by 
PRC = pQ - rQ - K - cQ - rFQ2/(2s(r» (1) 
The corresponding annual profit, PHA, can be obtained from equation (1) 
by dividing PRC by Q/s(r), the cycle length (period). Namely, 
PHA = ps(r)- rs(r) - Ks(r)/Q - cs(r) - rFQ/2 
* In order to obtain the profit maximizing selling quantity Q , PHA is 
differentiated with respect to Q and set equal to zero. Hence, 
Kgr/Q2 - rF/2 = ° 
given s(r) = gr. 
* From equation (3), the optimal selling quantity Q is given by 
Q* = (2Kg/F)O.5 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
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* From equation (4), the optimal selling quantity Q decreases as the 
annual holding cost F increases. On the other hand, the optimal selling 
* quantity Q increases as the fixed selling cost K or the supply 
proportionality constant g increases. 
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OPTIIAL SELLING qUANTITY AND PlJICBASING PRICE UNDER BASIC IODEL 
Let us now relax the assumption that the purchasing price r is 
fixed. Instead, in this subsection, we will assume that the intermediary 
firm can choose the unit price to the independent producers (i.e., r is 
a variable). Hence, we are maximizing PHA with respect to both r and Q 
simultaneously. By differentiating (2) with respect to Q and r and by 
setting the differentiated quantities equal to zero, we obtain two 
equations relating Q and r with other parameters ( P, K, F, g, and c). 
* Solving these two equations for the optimal selling quantity Q and 
* * purchasing price r . we find that Q is identical to that of the basic 
problem shown in equation (4). Moreover, the corresponding optimal 
* purchasing price r is given by 
r* = p/2 - (KF/(2g))O.5 - c/2 
From equation (5), we obtain intuitive results that the optimal 
* purchasing price r increases as the selling price p or supply 
proportionality constant g increases. On the other hand, the optimal 
* purchasing price r decreases as the fixed selling cost K, variable 
selling cost c, or annual holding cost F increases. 
(5) 
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BASIC IODEL VITR INSPECTION COST 
In this subsection, we make the following assumption : Prior to 
purchase by the intermediary firm, each unit of products is inspected 
for possible defectiveness at a cost of i per unit. Ve will assume that 
a fraction b (defect-rate) of s(r) is defective and the intermediary 
firm pays only for non-defective units. Ve will also assume that the 
intermediary firm determines both the selling quantity Q and the 
purchasing price r simultaneously. Under this additional assumption, the 
revenue per cycle is given by pQ while the payment to the independent 
producers per cycle is given by rQ. Also the total amount of supply 
including defective items per cycle is given by Q/(l-b). Hence, the 
total inspection cost per cycle is iQ/(l-b). The total selling cost per 
cycle is K + cQ and the inventory holding cost per cycle is 
rFQ2/(2(1-b)s(r». Therefore, the profit per cycle, PRC, which is the 
revenue less the cost, is given by 
PRC = pQ - rQ - iQ/(l-b) - K - cQ - rFQ2/(2(1-b)s(r» (6) 
The cycle length (period) is given by Q/((l-b)s(r». Dividing PRC by 
this cycle length, we obtain the corresponding annual profit, PRA, as 
below. 
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PRA = p(l-b)s(r) - r(l-b)s(r) - is(r) 
- (l-b)Ks(r)/Q - c(l-b)s(r) - rFQ/2 (7) 
* In order to obtain the profit maximizing selling quantity Q and 
* purchasing price r from (7), we perform a sequence of operations 
* analogous to the one shown in the previous subsection. The resulting Q 
* and r are given by 
Q* = (2(1-b)Kg/F)O.5 (8) 
r* = p/2 - (KF/(2(1-b)g)O.5 - i/(2(1-b» - c/2 (9) 
* From equation (8), the optimal selling quantity Q decreases as the 
annual holding cost F or defect-rate b increases. On the other hand, the 
* optimal selling quantity Q increases as the fixed selling cost K or the 
supply proportionality constant g increases. From equation (9), we 
* obtain intuitive results that the optimal purchasing price r increases 
as the selling price p or supply proportionality constant g increases. 
* On the other hand, the optimal purchasing price r decreases as the 
fixed selling cost K, variable selling cost c, per unit inspection cost 
i, defect-rate b, or annual holding cost F increases. 
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AN ILLUSTRATIVE IDIPLE 
ie solve a profit maximization problem over the selling quantity Q 
and purchasing price r to illustrate some of the features discussed. Let 
us assume the following values are provided either by estimations from 
free market or by regulatory rules. 
K = 1 
P = 10 
F = 0.05 
g = 0.5 
c = 0.5 
i = 0.1 
b = 0.05 
From equation (8) and (9), the optimal selling quantity and purchasing 
price are given by 
* Q = 4.359 
* r = 4.468 
It can be easily verified that the corresponding annual profit and the 
optimal cycle length are 9.482 and 2.054 respectively. 
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CONCLUDING lUAUS 
Ve have shown how to formulate the profit maximization problem for 
intermediary firms utilizing the special structure of the firms' 
environments. The optimal selling quantity and purchasing price are 
derived in terms of fixed and variable selling costs, supply 
proportionality constant, annual holding cost, selling price, inspection 
cost, and defect-rate. 
The observation that the supply rate s(r) depends on the purchasing 
price r is a prevalent feature in numerous other kinds of firms. For 
example, in order to operate efficiently, various types of processing 
and manufacturing firms (i.e., firms that process supplied inputs into 
different outputs as opposed to intermediary firms that accumulate 
supplied inputs and sell them to other firms) must take this relation 
between the supply rate of inputs and their corresponding prices into 
account. For such firms, the model in this paper can be a basis for 
further research. 
96 
IOO'ERENCES 
1. Tersine, R. J., Production/Operations Xanagement, North-Holland, New 
York (1985). 
2. Kailash, J., " Storage Space Costs and the EOQ Model, " Journal of 
Purchasing and Xaterials Xanagement, " Vol. 26, (1990), pp. 37-41. 
3. Smith, V., " An Investigation of Some Quantitative Relationships 
between Breakeven Point Analysis and Economic Lot Size Theory," 
Journal of Industrial Engineering, Vol. 9, (1958), pp. 52-57. 
4. Ladany, S. and Stemlieb, A., " The Interaction of Economic Ordering 
Quantities and Marketing Policies, " AIlE Transactions, Vol. 6, 
(1974), pp. 35-40. 
5. Arcelus, F. and Srinivasan G., " Inventory Policies under Various 
Optimizing Criteria and Variable Markup Rates," Xanagement Science, 
Vol. 33, (1987), pp.756-762. 
6. Schwaller, Richard L., "EOQ under Inspection Costs," Production and 
Inventory Xanagement Journal, Vol. 29, (1988), pp. 22-24. 
7. Hax, A. and Candea, D., Production and Inventory Xanagement, 
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. (1984). 
97 
PAPER 4. 
AN ANALYSIS OF oPTIIAL INVENTORY AND pnCING POLICIES 
UNDER LlNEAJl DElAND 
98 
An ANALYSIS 01' OPTIIlL IBVENTOIY AND PHCING POLICIES 
UNDm LINEAl DElAND 
Cheng-lang Chen and I. Jo .in 
Io~a State Univer3ity 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, for a single seller, we compare and contrast the optimal 
inventory and pricing policies under profit maximization vs. ROIl 
. 
(return on inventory investment) maximization when demand is linear in 
price. By studying the optimality conditions and the corresponding 
closed-form optimal solutions, several interesting economic implications 
are derived. In particular, we show that when a cost factor such as the 
setup cost, inventory holding cost per unit per unit time, or per unit 
ordering cost after the setup is sufficiently high, the choice of the 
objective between profit maximization and ROIl maximization is 
inconsequential to the seller in so far as his optimal decisions are 
concerned. 
99 
INTBDDUCTION 
In a recent paper by Rosenberg [5], for a single seller, optimal 
price-inventory decisions in the face of alternative criteria are 
studied for logarithmic concave demand functions (which include linear 
demand functions). The alternative models studied are a profit 
maximizing EOQ type model (the profit maximization model), an ROIl 
(return on inventory investment) maximizing EOQ type model (the ROIl 
maximization model), and an Economic Theory of the Firm model (the ETF 
model; a profit maximizing model without setup and inventory holding 
costs). In particular, under the linear demand assumption, these three 
models are analyzed in detail and numerical examples are presented. In 
the analysis, closed-form optimal solutions are employed for the ROIl 
maximization model and the ETF model while an examination of optimality 
conditions and an iterative procedure (e.g., the Newton-Raphson method) 
are employed for the profit maximization model. 
In this paper, however, for the profit maximization model, the 
closed-form optimal solution is employed for the analysis, which is 
attainable directly from the optimality conditions. The closed-form 
optimal solution for the profit maximization model enables us to perform 
more comprehensive and tangible analysis than the analysis shown in [5] 
under the assumption of linear demand in so far as the profit 
maximization model and ROIl maximization model are concerned. 
Specifically, in this paper, we compare and contrast the optimal 
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inventory and pricing policies for a single seller under profit 
maximization vs. ROIl maximization when demand is linear. First, we 
formulate the profit maximization model and the ROIl maximization model 
and derive the corresponding closed-form optimal solutions from the 
optimality conditions of the two models. Next, we obtain the relative 
bounds of the optimal decisions of the two models by examining the 
magnitudes of the closed-form optimal solutions. In addition, by 
studying the optimality conditions of the two models, we derive 
interesting relations among the price, average ordering cost, price 
elasticity of demand, and markup rate. Finally, we investigate the 
sensitivity of the optimal decisions with respect to the choice of the 
objective. In particular, we show that when a cost factor (e.g., the 
setup cost) is sufficiently high, the choice of the objective between 
profit maximization and ROIl maximization is inconsequential to the 
seller in so far as his optimal decisions are concerned. 
Throughout this paper, we assume that the seller will not operate 
(i.e., the seller will exit from the market) if his optimal profit 
(ROIl) level is strictly negative under profit (ROIl) maximization. 
Hence, we will consider only the cases where the optimal profit (ROIl) 
level under profit (ROIl) maximization is non-negative. i.e., a 
non-negative optimal profit (ROIl) level under profit (ROIl) 
maximization is assumed for the analysis. 
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BASIC IODELS 
We define the folloving variables and parameters for our models. 
Q the order quantity. 
d the demand per unit time. 
p the per unit price that clears d units in the market; 
p(d) = a - Pd, de[O, alP]. 
K the set up cost. 
c the per unit ordering cost after the setup. 
h the inventory holding cost per unit per unit time. 
hi: the inventory holding cost per unit per unit time excluding any 
opportunity cost; hi < h (i.e., a positive opportunity cost is 
assumed). 
T the cycle length. 
f the price elasticity of demand; f = d~~p) a. 
~ the profit per unit time. 
R the return on inventory investment (ROIl). 
In addition, throughout this paper, as in the conventional EOQ models 
(see e.g., Hillier and Lieberman [2]), ve viII assume that 1) the demand 
is constant over time given a price p; 2) the goods are ordered in equal 
quantities, Q at a time; 3) all Q units arrive vithout delivery lag; 4) 
no shortage is alloved. We nov derive the optimal solutions for the 
profit maximization model under linear demand. 
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rhe Profit lazi.ization lodel 
Under our definitions and assumptions, the total revenue per cycle, 
the total cost per cycle, and the cycle length are given by p(d)Q, K + 
cQ + hQ2/(2d), and Q/d, respectively. Hence, the corresponding profit 
per cycle and the profit per unit time are given by p(d)Q - K - cQ -
hQ2/(2d) and p(d)d - Kd/Q - cd - hQ/2, respectively. Since p(d) = a -
Pd, the profit per unit time (denoted by r) maximization problem is 
formulated as follows. 
Max r = d(a - pd - c) - Kd/Q - hQ/2 (1) 
d,Q 
The corresponding first order necessary conditions are given by 
~ = a - c - 2Pd - K/Q = 0 (2) 
~ = Kd/Q2 - h/2 = ° (3) 
By substituting and rearranging the relation Q = (2Kd/h)O.5 from (3) 
into (2), we obtain the optimality condition for d as follows: 
d1.5 + ~ dO.5 + (~)O.5 = ° (4) 
Sp 
By employing the trigonometric methods (see e.g., Chapter 3 of Mishina 
and Proskuyakov [3], Chapter 2 of Griffiths [1], or appendix of Porteus 
[4]), we obtain the optimal demand per unit time, dr' as follows. 
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d
r 
= 2(3pC) cos2(~) 
where cosO = _(~)0.5, and r/2 < 0 ~ 3r/4. 
4(0- c) 
(5) 
We note that the upper bound of 3r/4 on the critical angle 0 is obtained 
from the assumption that the resulting profit per unit time is 
non-negative. On the other hand, the lower bound of r/2 on the critical 
angle 0 implies that parameters p, h, and K should all be strictly 
positive in order for the profit maximization EOQ model to be 
non-degenerate. From (5), the corresponding order quantity Qr is: 
Q
r 
= (4~frh-C))0.5cOS(~) (6) 
for r/2 < 0 ~ 3r/4 and cosO = _(27PhK 3)°·5 
4(0- c) 
For r/2 < 0 ~ 3r/4, it can be easily verified that the second order 
sufficient conditions for the profit maximization are satisfied at (dr' 
Qr) given by expressions (5) and (6). 
From (5) and (6), we obtain the corresponding optimal price p and 
r 
cycle length Tr as follows. 
27PbK 0.5 
For r/2 < 0 ~ 3r/4 and cosO = -(~) , 
4(0- c) 
Pr = 0 - 2(3- c) cos2(~) 
T = (~)0.5(cos(O))-1 
r Il(ll-CJ g 
(7) 
(8) 
Given the optimal quantities (5)-(8), the corresponding profit and ROIl 
levels evaluated at the optimal quantities (5)-(8), r and R (see the 
r r 
next subsection for the derivation of ROIl), are obtained as below. 
27PhK 0.5 
For r/2 < 0 ~ 3r/4 and cosO = -(~) , 
4(0- c) 
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2 
rr = ~ (~OS4(:) - ~OS2(:» 
Rr = 2~ (COS2(:»/(3 - 4cos2(:» - ~' 
The J.II la~i.ization lodel 
(9) 
(10) 
Analogous to the case of the profit maximization model, the total 
revenue per cycle, the total cost per cycle excluding any opportunity 
cost in the inventory holding cost h (i.e., h is nov replaced by h'), 
and the cycle length are given by p(d)Q, K + cQ + h'Q2/(2d), and Q/d, 
respectively. Hence, the corresponding profit per cycle excluding any 
opportunity cost in the inventory holding cost h and the profit per unit 
time excluding any opportunity cost in the inventory holding cost hare 
given by p(d)Q - K - cQ - h'Q2/(2d) and p(d)d - Kd/Q - cd - h'Q/2, 
respectively. The value of inventory investment per unit time is given 
by cQ/2 because the amount of inventory per unit time is Q/2 and the per 
unit cost of ordering after the setup is c. The return on inventory 
investment (ROIl) is defined to be the ratio of profit per unit time 
excluding any opportunity cost in the inventory holding cost h to the 
value of inventory investment per unit time, cQ/2. Hence, the ROIl for 
the seller can be obtained by dividing p(d)d - Kd/Q - cd - h'Q/2 by 
cQ/2. Given the relation p(d) = a - Pd, the resulting ROIl maximization 
problem can be stated as follovs. 
lax R = 2d(a - pd - c)/(cQ) - 2Kd/(cQ2) - h'/c 
d,Q 
The corresponding first order necessary conditions are given by 
(11) 
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~ = 2(0 - 2Pd - c)/(cQ) - 2K/( cQ2) = 0 
~ = - 2d(0 - pd - C)/(CQ2) + 4Kd/(cQ3) = 0 
(12) 
(13) 
By solving equations (12) and (13) for the optimal demand per unit time 
dR and the optimal order quantity QR' ve obtain the following 
expressions. 
dR = (0 - c)/(3P) (14) 
QR = 3K/(0 - c) (15) 
3 
vhere 2(0 - c) > hi 2tpK - . 
3 
The condition 2(27PKc) ~ hi implies that the return on inventory 
investment is non-negative. Also, it can be easily verified that the 
second order sufficient conditions for the ROIl maximization are 
satisfied at (dR' QR) given by expressions (14) and (15). Given optimal 
quantities (14) and (15), ve can obtain the corresponding optimal price 
PR and cycle length TR as belovo 
PR = (c + 20)/3 
TR = 9PK/(a - c)2 
(16) 
(17) 
Given the optimal quantities (14)-(17), the corresponding profit and 
ROIl levels evaluated at the optimal quantities (14)-(17), xR and RR' 
are obtained as belovo 
XR = (a-c)2/(9P) - 3hK/(2(a-c» 
RR = 2(a-c)3/(27PcK) - h'/c 
(18) 
(19) 
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COlPillTIVE ANALYSIS OF OPTIIAL POLICIES: PIOFIT VS. 1011 
Jelative Boands of the 'pti.al Solations 
In this subsection, let us first compare the relative magnitudes of 
the optimal order quantities Qr and QR. From equations (6) and (15), the 
Q 
ratio of ~ is given by 
r 
~ = (3K/(a - c»/ ((4Ibli-C)0.5cOS(:» (20) 
r 
where cosO = _(~)0.5 for r/2 < 0 ~ 3r/4. 
4(a- c) 
The right hand side of equation (20) can be rearranged such that 
QR = (27PbK )0.5/cos(0) 
tr; ~ !J 
= -cosO/cos(:) (21) 
By employing the identity relation, cosO = 4cos3(:) - 3COS(:), we 
simplify equation (23) to become 
Q ~ = 3 - 4cos2(~) 
r 
(22) 
Since the range of 0/3 is such that r/6 < 0/3 ~ r/4, the range of cos(~) 
Q 
is such that (1/2)°·5 ~ cos(g) < (3/4)°·5. Hence, the range of ~ is 
r 
given by 
Q 
° < ~ ~ 1 
r 
The above inequalities imply that the optimal Qr under profit 
(23) 
maximization is always greater than or equal to the optimal QR under 
ROIl maximization. 
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Analogous to the above analysis, we can obtain the relative bounds 
of the optimal demands, prices, and cycle lengths. The results, which 
can be easily verified, are summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. Given the optimal order quantities, demands, prices, and 
cycle lengths shovn in equations (5) - (8) and (14) - (17), the 
following relative bounds hold. 
Q 
a) 0 < R < 1 lC-,. 
d 
b) ~ < ! ~ 1 
,. 
) 1 < PR < 1 a- c c - P,. + 3(a+c) 
T 
d) 0 < I- ~ 1 
,. 
Part b) of Proposition 1 states that dr is greater than or equal to dR' 
but d,. is strictly less than ~R' Part c) states that Pr is less than or 
equal to PR' but PR is strictly less than (1 + 3(~~c)P,.. Finally, Part 
d) states that TR is less than or equal to T,.. cf. the analysis in [5] 
which focuses more on the relative ordering of the optimal decisions and 
less on the relative bounds of the optimal decisions for logarithmic 
concave demand functions (which include linear demand functions). 
Elasticity inalysis 
Let us first investigate the relationship among price, average 
ordering cost, and price elasticity of demand under profit maximization. 
From equation (2), 
Pr - Pdr = Pr(l - Pdr/Pr) 
= K/Q r + C 
108 
(24) 
The price elasticity of demand at the optimality, fr = -Pr/(Pdr ) = 1 -
(3a/(2(a-c)cos2(~») vhere cosO = _(~)0.5 for r/2 < 9 ~ 3r/4. 
4(a-c) 
Hence, equation (24) becomes Pr (l + l/f r) = K/Qr + c; i.e., 
Pr = (fr/(fr + l»(K/Qr + c) (25) 
Equation (25) states that the optimal price gets close to the average 
ordering cost as the demand becomes more elastic vith respect to the 
price. On the other hand, the optimal price gets farther avay from the 
average ordering cost as the demand becomes more inelastic vith respect 
to the price. If ve viev the term fr/(fr + 1) as the markup rate, we can 
clearly see that as the demand becomes more inelastic (elastic), the 
markup rate increases (decreases). 
Analogous to the profit maximization case above, from equation 
(12), we obtain the relationship among price, average ordering cost, and 
price elasticity of demand under ROIl maximization as follows. 
(26) 
The economic interpretations of equation (26) are similar to those of 
equation (25) where fR = (c + 2a)/(c - a). The relative bounds on the 
magnitudes of fr and fR can be shown to be: 
(27) 
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Equation (27) states that the demand at the maximum ROIl is more elastic 
than the demand at the maximum profit. This implies that the optimal 
markup rate for the ROIl maximization will be lower than the optimal 
markup rate for the profit maximization. It can be easily verified that 
the relative bounds of the magnitudes of the markup rate under ROIl 
maximization, HR, and the markup rate under profit maximization, 
as follows. 
H 
1 < r < (a+cl~a+2c) 
- Hi 2c a+c) 
M , are 
r 
(28) 
The fact that the optimal markup rate under profit maximization is 
greater than or equal to the optimal markup rate under ROIl maximization 
does not contradict the fact that the optimal price under profit 
maximization is less than or equal to the optimal price under ROIl 
maximization (See Part c) of Proposition 1). The reason is that the 
corresponding average ordering cost at the maximum profit is less than 
or equal to the corresponding average ordering cost at the maximum ROIl 
(See equations (25) and (26». 
Sensitivity Analysis ~ith respect to the Choice of the Objective 
In this subsection, we will first analyze the impact on the 
difference between the optimal order quantities Q
r 
and QR when the 
inventory holding cost per unit per unit time h changes. From equations 
(6) and (15), the difference between Qr and QR' ~Q = Qr - QR' is given 
by 
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~Q = (4~M-C)0.5cOS(~) - 3K/(a - c) (29) 
for ~/2 < 0 ~ 3~/4 and cosO = _(27PhK 3)°·5 
4(a- c) 
It can be shown that when h = 2(a-c)3/(27P!) (the highest inventory 
holding cost per unit per unit time under which the seller is willing to 
operate; when h is equal to this upper bound, the corresponding optimal 
profit is zero), ~Q = 0. It also can be shown that ~Q < ° for ° < h ~ 
2(a-c)3/(27PK). i.e., 6Q is a monotone decreasing function in h and 6Ql h 
= 2(a-c)3/(27PK) = 0. These imply that as h increases, the difference 
between the optimal order quantity under profit maximization and the 
optimal order quantity under ROIl maximization gets smaller. 
Furthermore, when h = 2(a-c)3/(27P!) , the optimal order quantity under 
profit maximization is identical to the optimal order quantity under 
ROIl maximization. 
Analogous to the above analysis, we can analyze the impact on the 
difference between the optimal demands d~ and dR' prices p~ and PR' and 
cycle lengths T~ and TR when the inventory holding cost per unit per 
unit time h changes. The results, which can be easily verified, are 
summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2. 
Given the optimal order quantities, demands, prices, and cycle 
lengths shown in equations (5) - (8) and (14) - (17), for ° < h ~ 
2(a-c)3/(27PK) , the following statements hold. 
a) The differences between Q~ and QR' d~ and dR' p~ and PR' and T~ 
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and TR all monotonically decrease as h increases. 
b) When h = 2(a-c)3/(27PK), the optimal decisions under profit 
maximization and the optimal decisions under ROIl maximization are 
identical. 
The above proposition implies that as h approaches its upper bound 
of h = 2(a-c)3/(27PK), the optimal decisions on the order quantity, 
demand, price, and cycle length become less sensitive to the seller's 
choice of the objective between profit maximization and ROIl 
maximization. 
We now proceed to analyze the impact on the difference between the 
optimal order quantities Q
r 
and QR when the set up cost K changes. Once 
again, 6Q (= Qr - QR) is given by equation (29). It can be shown that 
when K = 2(a-c)3/(27Ph) (the highest setup cost under which the seller 
is willing to operate; when K is equal to this upper bound, the 
corresponding optimal profit is zero), 6Q = O. It also can be shown that 
as K approaches zero, so do Q
r 
and QR (i.e., 6Q also approaches zero). 
Finally, it can be shown that, for 0 < K ~ 2(a-c)3/(27Ph), 6Q is a 
concave function in K and has its maximum value with respect to K when K 
~ O.1298(4(a-c)3)/(27Ph). These imply that as K increases or decreases 
from the critical value of K ~ O.1298(4(a-c)3)/(27Ph), the difference 
between the optimal order quantity under profit maximization and the 
optimal order quantity under ROIl maximization gets smaller. 
Furthermore, the optimal order quantity under profit maximization 
approaches the optimal order quantity under ROIl maximization when K 
approaches zero. Finally, when K = 2(a-c)3/(27Ph), the optimal order 
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quantity under profit maximization is identical to the optimal order 
quantity under ROIl maximization. 
Analogous to the above analysis, we can analyze the impact on the 
difference between the optimal demands dr and dR' prices Pr and PR' and 
cycle lengths Tr and Ta when the setup cost K changes. The results, 
which can be easily verified, are summarized in the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 3. 
Given the optimal order quantities, demands, prices, and cycle 
lengths shown in equations (5) - (8) and (14) - (17), for 0 < K ~ 
2(a-c)3/(27pb), the following statements hold. 
a) The differences between dr and da as well as Pr and PR 
monotonically decrease as K increases. 
b) The difference between Qr and Qa monotonically decreases as K 
increases or decreases from the critical value of K ~ 
O.1298(4(a-c)3)/(27pb). 
c) The difference between Tr and TR monotonically decreases as K 
increases or decreases from the critical value of K ~ 
O.1151(4(a-c)3)/(27pb). 
d) When K = 2(a-c)3/(27pb) , the optimal decisions under profit 
maximization and the optimal decisions under ROIl maximization are 
identical. 
e) When K approaches zero, the optimal order quantity and the cycle 
length under profit maximization approaches the optimal order quantity 
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and the cycle length under ROIl maximization. 
The above proposition implies that as K approaches its upper bound 
of K = 2(a-c)3/(27Ph), the optimal demand and price become less 
sensitive to the seller's choice of the objective between profit 
maximization and ROIl maximization. In addition, as K approaches its 
upper bound of K = 2(a-c)3/(27Ph) from the critical value of K ~ 
O.1298(4(a-c)3)/(27Ph) (K ~ O.1151(4(a-c)3)/(27Ph», the optimal order 
quantity (cycle length) becomes less sensitive to the the seller's 
choice of the objective between profit maximization and ROIl 
maximization. Also, as K approaches its lower bound of K = 0 from the 
critical value of K ~ O.1298(4(a-c)3)/(27Ph) (K ~ 
O.1151(4(a-c)3)/(27Ph», the optimal order quantity (cycle length) 
becomes less sensitive to the the seller's choice of the objective 
between profit maximization and ROIl maximization. 
Finally, by employing similar analysis techniques shown in the 
cases of changes in h and K, we can analyze the impact on the difference 
between the optimal order quantity Qr and QR, demands dr and dR' prices 
Pr and PR' and cycle lengths Tr and TR when the per unit ordering cost c 
changes. The results, which can be easily verified, are summarized in 
the following proposition. 
Proposition 4. 
Given the optimal order quantities, demands, prices, and cycle 
lengths shown in equations (5) - (8) and (14) - (17), for 0 < c ~ a -
(27PbK/2)1/3, the following statements hold. 
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a) The differences between Qr and QR' dr and dR' and Pr and PR 
monotonically decrease as c increases. 
b) The difference between Tr and TR monotonically decreases as c 
increases or decreases from the critical value of c ~ a -
(245.637PhK)1/3. 
c) Vhen c = a - (27PhK/2)1/3, the optimal decisions under profit 
maximization and the optimal decisions under ROIl maximization are 
identical. 
The above proposition implies that as c approaches its upper bound 
of c = a - (27PbK/2) 1/3 , the optimal order quantity, demand, and price 
become less sensitive to the seller's choice of the objective between 
profit maximization and ROIl maximization. In addition, as c approaches 
its upper bound c = a - (27PbK/2)1/3 from the critical value of c ~ a -
(245.637PhK)1/3, the optimal cycle length becomes less sensitive to the 
the seller's choice of the objective between profit maximization and 
ROIl maximization. 
From Propositions 2 through 4, we summarize that when any of the 
cost factors among h, K, and c is sufficiently high, the differences 
between the optimal decisions under profit maximization and the optimal 
decisions under ROIl maximization are negligible. In addition, we note, 
that as a cost factor such as h, K, or c approaches its upper bound, the 
profit levels rr and rR given by equations (9) and (18) approach zero. 
On the other hand, since hi < h (i.e., there is a positive opportunity 
cost; an assumption made in the Basic Models section), the ROIl levels 
Rr and Ra given by equations (10) and (19) approach h/c - h'/c, which is 
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a strictly positive quantity. Finally, we note that Part b) of 
Proposition 2, Part d) of Proposition 3, and Part c) of Proposition 4 
are consistent with the observation in [5] that, in the case of zero 
profit, "the profit and ROIl models are in agreement on the optimal 
price-inventory decisions." 
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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we extend the existing work on the priority 
rationing of electric power by incorporating commonly shared random 
factors (such as temperature or humidity) associated with customers' 
valuation of electric power and the uncertainty associated with the 
estimation of the total amount of electric power demanded. Next, under 
the assumption that customers are risk-averse, we formulate an 
interruption insurance model to transfer the risk of customers to the 
risk-neutral electric power supplier. Finally, via numerical examples, 
we attempt to investigate the effects of errors due to the assumptions 
that customers' valuation and/or the total amount of electric power 
demanded are constant over time (when they actually vary due to random 
factors). 
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INTlODUCTION 
The classical theory of electric power priority rationing (see 
e.g., Vilson [5]) assumes that electric power customers can choose a 
level of service for each unit of load that will determine its rationing 
priority in case of shortage. The menu of service options presented to 
all (potential) customers may be characterized in terms of reliability 
levels or interruption compensation levels and the corresponding price 
levels. In either case, however, it is assumed that customers are aware 
of the power curtailment probability associated with each level of 
service and self-select the level of service that will maximize their 
expected net benefits. 
In classical priority rationing models (see e.g., Chao and Oren et 
ale [1]), in case of shortage, the supplier always curtail power in 
ascending order of interruption loss. In this way, the social loss due 
to power shortages is minimized and an economically efficient allocation 
of electric power is achieved. The main task of the supplier is to 
determine the socially optimal level of reliability for each priority 
class and the corresponding level of price to be charged, taking the 
customers' expected net benefit maximizing behavior into consideration. 
The cause of electric power shortages in the classical priority 
rationing models is assumed to be power generation or transmission 
failures. That is, the interruption losses occur due to physical failure 
on the supplier side. A more recent priority rationing model by Chao and 
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Wilson [2], however, incorporates an additional uncertainty on the 
supplier side. Namely, they mathematically characterize the uncertainty 
associated with the supplier's spot price of electric power and the 
corresponding amount of electric power demanded. 
In all these previous models of priority rationing, customers' 
valuation of a unit load of electric power is assumed to be constant 
over time. However, it is more reasonable to assume that random factors 
commonly shared by the customers such as temperature or humidity do 
affect the customers' valuation of a unit load. In addition, the total 
amount of electric power demanded can be viewed as stochastic because 
the supplier may not be able to accurately estimate it. In this project, 
we extend the existing work on the priority rationing by incorporating 
commonly shared random factors into the customers' valuation of electric 
power. Also, under the assumption that customers are risk-averse, we 
formulate an interruption insurance model to transfer the risk of 
customers to the risk-neutral electric power supplier. Finally, via 
numerical examples, we investigate the effects of estimation errors due 
to the assumptions that customers' valuation and/or the total amount of 
electric power demanded are constant (when they actually vary due to 
random factors). 
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PBlOBlTY BATIONINGjPBlCING IODEL 
Ve characterize the customer heterogeneity in terms of a customer's 
valuation index t E [0,1]. This index serves as the preference ranking 
of a customer relative to other customers in terms of preference for 
higher reliability of delivering electric power. In this report, larger 
t corresponds to higher reliability of delivering electric power; and 
vice versa. Hence, t=O defines the lowest ranked customer valuation and 
t=l the highest. The contingency demand function is characterized by 
D(t,[), the total amount of electric power demanded in a given period 
with customer valuation t or higher under contingency F . The vector F = 
N N 
(F1, F2, F3,···,Fk) denotes a random vector whose elements correspond to 
estimation factors that affect the customers' valuation distribution of 
demand. According to our definition of the customer valuation index t, 
we assume that there is a corresponding utility function U(t,!) for all 
customer valuation index t under contingency!. The vector! = (A1, A2, 
A3'···' Ah) denotes a random vector whose elements corresponding to 
factors that affect the customers' valuation of utility. Moreover, the 
contingency supply function is characterized by S(~), the total amount 
of electric power supplied in a given period under contingency B. The 
N 
vector ~ = (B1, B2, B3,···,Bj ) denotes a random vector whose elements 
correspond to factors that affect the total amount of electric power 
supplied in a given period. Ve assume that the sample space 1 for [ (a 
for !, ~ for ~) and the corresponding joint probability distributions 
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Prob{!} (Prob{~}, Prob{b}) over all possible realizations! f 7 (~ f a, 
b f P respectively) are known to the electric power supplier. Ve 
generally assume that random factors A, F, and B are independent (cf. 
the second numerical example in the illustrative numerical example 
section). Also the electric power supplier is assumed to have complete 
knowledge of customers' valuation distribution D(t, [) and the form of 
the utility function U(t,!), but he can not identify the particular type 
of a customer. Just as in the classical theory of priority rationing of 
electric power, we will assume that only one interruption may occur per 
period and the duration of an interruption is constant. 
In order to implement this allocation mechanism, discretization 
schemes for the continuous customer ranks are necessary. For the 
discretization of customer valuation index t, we employ the concept of 
customer blocks, or classes. Specifically, we will assume there are M 
customer blocks and customer block i consists of customer valuation 
index t f [t i , t i- 1] where i = 1,2,3,···, I and to = 1. The customers 
of type t., i = 0, 1,2,···1 will be referred to as boundary customers. 
1 
The corresponding quantity demanded for customer block i is given by 
D(t.,F) - D(t. 1,F) under contingency F while the boundary customer t.'s 1 N 1- N N 1 
utility under contingency! will be U(t i , !). Throughout the rest of 
this report, for notational simplification, we will denote F as F, A as 
N N 
A, and B as B. 
N 
Ve start the priority rationing for electric power as follows 
under all possible contingencies, the electric power supplier will 
deliver electric power to the highest customer block first, until the 
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demand for the first class is met. Only then does the delivery to the 
second class customers start, and only after the second class, the 
delivery for the third class, and son on. This rationing scheme 
terminates when either the supply of electric power is exhausted or when 
all demands are satisfied. 
While the priority rationing rule determines ex-post (i.e., after 
the electric power generation) the relationship between the priority 
class and the quantity supplied and demanded, customers' ex-ante (i.e., 
before the electric power generation) purchase decision will be based on 
a reliability forecast of that relation. Such a forecast will specify 
r., the delivery reliability of electric power to a customer in priority 
1 
class i averaged over all possible contingencies. This forecast must 
take into consideration both the rationing rule and the anticipated 
response by customers. Such response will obviously depend on the price 
corresponding to each class, which is controlled by the electric power 
supplier. 
Ve will now proceed to express the priority rationing rules and 
reliability level r. under the priority scheme. For this purpose, we 
1 
introduce variables denoting the amount of electric power available and 
the amount of shortage/surplus under each contingency f E 7 and b E P 
as follows 
Sb electric power supply given B = b 
Qifb remaining demand in class i after using up supply Sb' 
given F = f and B = b 
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Rifb remaining supply after delivering class 1, given F = f and 
B = b 
cifb = (D(ti,f) - D(ti_1,f)) - Qifb : actual amount of electric 
power delivered to class i, given F = f and B = b 
The demand for each priority class, given F = f, is given by 
D(ti,f) - D(t i_1,f) = Dif - Di-1f for i = 1,2, 3,"', M where DOf = O. 
Consequently, we can express the supply and demand relations with 
respect to each class under the priority pricing recursively as follows 
Qifb = Max[(Dif - Di- tf ) - Ri- ifb , 0] 
Rifb = Ri- tfb - [(Dif - Di_tf) - Qifb] 
i = 1, 2, 3"", M, for all b f P and f f 7 where ROfb = Sb' to = 
1, and D Of = O. 
According to the priority pricing rule described above, under any 
given contingency b, the conditional reliability rib is : 
cifb 
r· b = E Prob{f} D D 1 ff7 if - i-if 
From averaging rib over all possible contingencies, we have 
[ 
C· f b ] 
r. = E Prob{b} E Prob{f} DID 
1 bfP ff7 if - i-lf 
Under the proposed scheme, the producer's price schedule will 
consist of priority prices and the corresponding forecast of delivery 
reliability for the electric power as shown in Table 1. 
ie now turn to modeling the customers decisions. We assume that 
customers are expected value decision makers and the identical price 
table is provided to all potential customers. Then, each customer t's 
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expected utility and net expected utility when he orders a unit of 
priority class i are given by, 
EUi(t) = r· ~ Prob{a} U(t.,A) 1 afA 1 
and NEUi(t) = r. ~ Prob{a} U(t.,A) - p .. 1 afA 1 1 
Class Price Delivery Reliability of Electric Power 
1 P1 r1 
2 P2 r2 
· · · 
· · · 
· · · 
· · · 
M PM r m 
Table 1. Price Table of Priority Pricing for Electric Power 
The optimal customers' behavior or self-selection is simple to choose 
A 
priority level i, where NEU: = M~ NEUi(t). Ve represent the market 
1 1 
segmentation of all customers in terms of the following boundary 
customers relations, given appropriate prices, P1' P2' P3'···' PM· 
For i = 1, 2, 3,···, M-1 
r. ~ Prob{a} U(t1·,A) -1 afA 
rM ~ Prob{a} U(tM,A) -afA 
Pl· = r. 1 ~ Prob{a} U(t.,A) - p. 1 1+ afA 1 1+ 
PM = o. 
The above relations state that the boundary customer t., i = 1,2, 
1 
3,···, M-1, is indifferent between purchasing priority class i and i+l 
and the last boundary customer tM is indifferent between subscribing to 
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priority level M or withdrawing from the market. Also it can be easily 
verified that all non-boundary customers of customer valuation index t E 
[ti' t i_1] will purchase priority class i, i = 1,2,3"", M. 
For the basic model described thus far, the corresponding formulae 
for the expected profit, expected customer surplus, and expected total 
surplus are obtained as follows. 
Expected Profit : 
I 
E7 = ~ Prob{f}[.~ Pi(D(ti,f) - D(ti_1,f))] ff7 1=1 
Expected Customer Surplus : 
ECS = ~ prob{f}[ ~ prob{a}[.~ Jti riU(t,A)dD(t,F)]] 
ff7 afA 1=1 t i_1 
- T 
Expected Total Surplus : 
ETS = ~ prob{f}[ ~ prOb{a}[.~ Jti riU(t,A)dD(t,F)]] 
ff7 aEA 1=1 t i_1 
So far, the entire formulation for the electric power expected 
total surplus maximization problem is shown as follows. 
The Formulation for the Electric Power 
Expected Total Surplus Maximization Problem 
Maximize ETS = E prOb{f}[ E prob{a}[.~ Jti riU(t,A)dD(t,F)l] 
ff7 afA 1=1 t. 1 1-
subject to : 
1 = to ~ t1 ~ t2 ~ ... ~ tl 
P1 ~ P2 ~ P3 ~ ....... ~ PI 
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all variables ~ 0 
Boundary Customers Relations 
r i ~ Prob{a} U(t.,A) -afA 1 Pi = ri+l ~ Prob{a} U(t.,A) - P1·+l afA 1 
rM ~ Prob{a} U(t.,A) -afA PI = O. 
Priority Rationing Relations : 
Qifb = lax[(Dif - Di - lf) - Ri - lfb , 0] 
Rifb = Ri- lfb - [(Dif - Di - lf ) - Qifb] 
i = 1,2, 3"", I, for all b f P and f f 7 
where ROfb = Sb' to = 1, and DOf = O. 
Reliability of Delivery Relations : 
r. = ~ Prob{b} [~ Prob{f} D Cif~ ] 
1 bfP ff7 if - i-lf 
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INTEIIUPTIOlf IlfSWlfCE IODEL 
In the literature of electric power demand management, there have 
been numerous articles on insurance for power interruption. In this 
section, we will explore a way to implement the insurance under the 
assumptions of random factors (e.g., temperature or humidity) in 
customers' valuation and the uncertainty of the total amount of electric 
power demanded. Customers are assumed to be risk averse expected utility 
maximizers (see e.g., Varian [4] or Oren and Doucet [3]) and the 
electric power supplier is assumed to be risk-neutral. To quote from 
Vilson [5], "If customers are risk averse, then full efficiency requires 
that risks are shared efficiently among the customers and the firm. In 
important application such as power, a state enterprise or public 
utility is much less risk averse than each customer. Consequently, we 
investigate the case that the firm or a private underwriter offers 
compensatory insurance against the risk of loss from service 
interruptions, and does so at actuarially fair rates". An identical 
premium price schedule is offered to all potential customers. The 
proposed premium price schedule consists of a service charge s paid only 
when electric power is delivered, an insurance premium Gi , a 
compensation level K. and the corresponding forecast of delivery 
l. 
reliability r i of electric power. The proposed tariff is shown as table 
2. 
Under this premium price schedule, a consumer t selecting class i 
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will receive a net benefit of EUi(t) - s - Gi with probability r i and Ki 
- Gi with probability 1 - rio To quote from Varian [4], "if the customer 
is a risk averse expected utility maximizer, and if he is offered fair 
insurance against a loss, then he will optimally choose to fully 
insure". Therefore, for a risk-averse customer, he will gladly choose 
full insurance to avoid risk. The full insurance relation is shown as 
follows. 
EU.(t) - s - G. = I. - G1· for 1 = 1,2,3,····1. 111 
PrIce 
Class Reliability ServIce charge PremIum 
1 r1 s G1 
2 r2 for all G2 
· · 
priority 
· 
· · · 
· · classes · 
· · · 
I rl GI 
Compensation 
II 
II 
II 
Table 2. Tariff for interruption insurance model 
Under the proposed interruption insurance scheme, the boundary 
customer relations should be modified as follows. 
r. [~Prob{a} U(t.,A) - s] + (1 - r.) I. - G. 
1 A 1 111 af 
= r· 1[ ~ Prob{a} U(t.,A) - s] + (1 - r. 1) I. 1 - G. 1 1+ A 1 1+ 1+ 1+ af 
rl [ ~ Prob{a} U(tl,A) - s ] + (1 - rl ) II - GI = O. 
afA 
The corresponding formulae for the expected profit, expected 
customer surplus, and expected total surplus are obtained as follows. 
130 
Expected Profit : 
I 
Er = E Prob{f}[ E (r.s+G.)(D(t.,f) - D(t. 1,f»] 
f . 1 1 1 1 1-q 1= 
I 
- E Prob{f}E.E (l-ri)li(D(ti'f) - D(t·_ 1,f»] fE1 1=1 1 
Expected Customer Surplus : 
ECS = E prob{f}[ E prob{a}[.~ Jti [riU(t,A)+(l-ri)KildD(t,F)l] 
fE1 at! 1=1 t. 1 I-
I 
- E Prob{f}[.E (ris+Gi)(D(ti'f) - D(t i_1,f»] fq 1=1 
Expected Total Surplus : 
ETS = E prob{f}[ E prob{a}[.~ Jti riU(t,!)dD(t,F)]] 
ff1 at! 1=1 t. 1 I-
SO far, the entire formulation for the interruption insurance model 
is shown as follows. 
The Formulation for the Interruption Insurance Model 
Maximize ETS = E Prob{f}[ E prob{a}[.~ Jti riU(t,A)dD(t,F)l] 
ff1 at! 1=1 t. 1 
subject to : 
1 = to ~ tl ~ t2 ~ .•. ~ tl 
G1 ~ G2 ~ G3 ~ ....... ~ G1 
all variables ~ 0 
Full Insurance Relations : 
1-
EUi(t) - s - Gi = Ii - Gi for i = 1,2,3,·· ··M. 
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Boundary Customers Relations 
r.[ ~ Prob{a} U(t.,A) - s] + (1 - r.) I. - G. 
1 afA 1 1 1 1 
= r i +1[ ~ Prob{a} U(ti,A) - s] + (1 - r i +1) li+l - Gi+1 aEA 
rl [ ~ Prob{a} U(tl,A) - s ] + (1 - r.) II - GI = o. afA 
Priority Rationing Relations : 
Qifb = lax[(Dif - Di- 1f) - Ri- 1fb , 0] 
Rifb = Ri- 1fb - [(Dif - Di- 1f) - Qifb] 
i = 1, 2, 3,···, I, for all b f P and f f 7 
where ROfb = Sb' to = 1, and DOf = o. 
Reliability of Delivery Relations : 
r. = ~ Prob{b} [~ Prob{f} D cifg ] 
1 bfP fE7 if - i-1f 
By comparing the interruption insurance model in this section and 
the priority rationing/pricing model in the previous section, we have 
the following observations. 
1) If we set the compensation levels for all classes equal to zero 
(e.g., the electric power supplier will not offer the interruption 
insurance service), then the interruption insurance model will be 
reduced to the priority rationing/pricing model and the relation of the 
price in the priority rationing/pricing model and service charge and 
insurance premium in the interruption insurance is p. = r·s + G .. 
1 1 1 
2) If the service charge and the compensation level is restricted to be 
zero, then there is no difference between priority/pricing model and 
interruption insurance model, and the price Pi of priority/pricing model 
equals to the insurance premium Gi of interruption insurance model. 
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ILLUSTUTIVE N1JIElICAL EImLES 
In this section, we will discuss three numerical examples. In the 
first (second) example, we will investigate the effects of erroneously 
assuming that the demand (the customers' valuation) for the electric 
power is constant over time when it actually is not. Finally, in the 
third example, we illustrate how the interruption insurance scheme can 
be implemented under the assumptions of random factors (e.g., 
temperature or humidity) in customers' valuation and the uncertainty of 
the total amount of electric power demanded. 
Different demand function assumptions 
In this subsection, we discuss two numerical examples under 
different demand function assumptions. For the first model, we assume 
that the demand function D(t,E) contains random factors E. For the 
second model, we assume that the demand function is constant. 
Specifically, in order to investigate the effects of erroneously 
assuming that the demand for the electric power is constant over time, 
we will assume that the demand function of the second model is the 
expected value of the first model.i.e., ED(t) = ~ Prob{f} D(t,E). The 
fq 
relevant utility, demand, and supply functions are assumed to be as 
follows: 
U(t,A) = t 1/A if A=l with probability = 0.25 
if A=2 with probability = 0.75 
133 
F D(t,F) = 1-t if F=1 with probability = 0.25 
if F=2 with probability = 0.75 
S(B) = 0.9 - 0.lB2 if B=l with probability = 0.5 
if B=2 with probability = 0.5 
where t E [0,1]. 
Ve also assume that the number of priority class. = 2. Ve solve this 
problem employing the formulation shown in the priority 
rationing/pricing model section. The resulting optimal solution is given 
by Table 3. 
The resulting expected market share (i.e., expected demand of 
electric power), expected profit, expected consumer surplus, and 
expected total surplus from classes 1 and 2 are summarized in table 4. 
Let us now suppose that the demand for electric power is assumed to 
be constant over time and the corresponding demand function is given by 
D(t) = 1 - -i- t - -i- to. 5 (i.e., the expected demand function of the 
first model). Under this assumption, the resulting optimal solution is 
given by Table 5. 
The corresponding expected market share, expected profit, expected 
consumer surplus, and expected total surplus from classes 1 and 2 are 
summarized in table 6. 
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Class Price Reliability of Delivering Electric Power 
1 P1 == 0.516 r1 == 0.875 
2 P2 == 0.083 r2 == 0.214 
Table 3. Price Table under demand function with random factors 
Class EMS Er ECS ETS 
1 0.687 0.354 0.157 0.511 
2 0.232 0.019 0.008 0.027 
Table 4. Welfare outcomes with demand uncertainty 
(EMS denotes the expected market share) 
Class Price Reliability of Delivering Electric Power 
1 P1 == 0.666 r1 == 1.000 
2 P2 == 0.277 r2 == 0.500 
Table 5. Price Table under expected demand function 
Class EMS Er ECS ETS 
1 0.500 0.333 0.116 0.449 
2 0.300 0.083 0.019 0.102 
Table 6. Welfare outcomes with constant demand function 
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From Tables 3-6, we observe the followings: 
1) The corresponding levels of expected total surplus under these two 
models are 0.538 and 0.551 respectively. Hence, the second model 
overestimates the level of expected total surplus by 2.417.. 
2) The prices as well as the corresponding reliability levels for 
priority classes 1 and 2 have increased in the second model. 
3) The expected market shares, the expected profit levels, the expected 
customer surplus levels as well as the expected total surplus levels 
for priority class 1 (priority class 2) in the first model are larger 
(smaller) than those in the second model. 
As shown by 1), 2), and 3), the constant demand function assumption 
may substantially distort the critical economic quantities such as the 
levels of reliability, the corresponding prices, and the total surplus 
levels. 
Different utility function assumptions 
In this subsection, we investigate two numerical examples under 
different utility function assumptions. In this particular case, we will 
assume that F is a function of A. Specifically, F = A. For the first 
model, we assume that the utility function U(t,!) contains commonly 
shared random factors A. For the second model, in order to investigate 
N 
the effects of erroneously assuming that the customers' valuation is 
constant over time, we will take the expectation of utility function of 
the first model over all contingency!, i.e., EU(t) = ~AProb{a} U(t,!), 
aE 
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as the (constant) utility function. The relevant utility, demand, and 
supply functions are assumed to be as follows : 
U(t,A) = t x exp(A) if A=l with probability = 0.25 
if A=10 with probability = 0.75 
A D(t,A) = 1-t if A=l with probability = 0.25 
if A=10 with probability = 0.75 
2 S(B) = 0.9 - O.lB if B=l with probability = 0.5 
if B=2 with probability = 0.5 
where t E [0,1]. 
Ve also assume that the number of priority class H = 2. Ve solve this 
problem employing the formulation shown in the priority 
rationing/pricing model section. The resulting optimal solution is given 
by Table 7. 
The resulting expected market share (i.e., expected demand of 
electric power), expected profit, expected consumer surplus, and 
expected total surplus from classes 1 and 2 are summarized in table 8. 
Let us now suppose that the customers' valuation is assumed to be 
constant over time and the corresponding utility function is given by 
U(t) = ~ t x exp(l) + -l- t x exp(10) (i.e., the expected utility 
function of the first model). Under this assumption, the resulting 
optimal solution is given by Table 9. 
The corresponding expected market share, expected profit, expected 
consumer surplus, and expected total surplus from classes 1 and 2 are 
summarized in table 10. 
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Class Price Reliability of Delivering Electric Power 
1 P1 = 10635.2 r1 = 0.859 
2 P2 = 2065.07 r2 = 0.250 
Table 7. Price Table under utility function with random factors 
Class EMS Er ECS ETS 
1 0.637 6776.68 3932.03 10708.71 
2 0.237 489.632 147.848 637.48 
Table 8. Velfare outcomes with customers' valuation uncertainty 
(EMS denotes the expected market share) 
Class Price Reliability of Delivering Electric Power 
1 P1 = 5476.36 r1 = 0.738 
2 P2 = 413.013 r2 = 0.125 
Table 9. Price Table under expected utility function 
Class EMS Er ECS ETS 
1 0.874 4786.34 4665.445 9451. 78 
2 0.076 31.389 23.50645 54.895 
Table 10. Velfare outcomes with constant customers' valuation 
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From Tables 7-10, ~e observe the follo~ing: 
1) The corresponding levels of expected total surplus under these t~o 
models are 11346.192 and 9506.4 respectively. Hence, the second model 
underestimates the level of expected total surplus by 19.357.. 
2) The prices as ~ell as the corresponding reliability levels for 
priority classes 1 and 2 have decreased in the second model. 
3) The expected market shares as ~ell as the expected customers' surplus 
for priority class 1 (priority class 2) in the first model are 
smaller (larger) than those in the second model. 
4) The expected profit levels as ~ell as the expected total surplus 
levels for priority class 1 and 2 have decreased in the second model. 
As sho~ by 1),2),3), and 4), the constant customers' valuation 
assumption may substantially distort the critical economic quantities 
such as the levels of reliability, the corresponding prices, and the 
total surplus levels. 
1 Numerical Example for Interruption Insurance lodel 
In this subsection, ~e employ the relevant utility, demand, and 
supply functions from the first set of numerical examples and consider 
both demand function and utility function ~ith randomness. Ve solve this 
problem by employing the formulation sho~n in the interruption insurance 
model. The resulting optimal solution is given by Table 11. 
The corresponding expected market share, expected profit, expected 
consumer surplus, and expected total surplus from classes 1 and 2 are 
summarized in table 12 . 
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Prlce 
Class Reliability :SerVIce charge PremIum Compensation 
1 r1= 0.875 G1= 0.297 11= 0.355 s = 0.300 
2 r2= 0.214 G2= 0.085 12= 0.085 
Table 11. Price table for interruption insurance model 
Class EMS Er ECS ETS 
1 0.687 0.354 0.157 0.511 
2 0.232 0.019 0.008 0.027 
Table 12. Welfare outcomes for interruption insurance model 
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CONCLUDING BEIABIS 
In this paper, we extended the existing work on the priority 
rationing by incorporating the commonly shared random factors into the 
customers' valuation of electric power and the estimation uncertainty 
into the total amount of electric power demanded. loreover,under the 
assumption that customers are risk-averse, we formulate an interruption 
insurance model to transfer the risk of customers to the risk-neutral 
electric power supplier. We also attempted to investigate the effects of 
errors due to the assumptions that customers' valuation and/ or the 
total amount of electric power demanded are constant over time (when 
they actually vary due to random factors) via numerical examples. 
The model presented in this paper as well as the previous models of 
priority rationing can be further improved by considering uncertainty 
associated with customers' quantity demanded. In contrast to the demand 
uncertainty due to the supplier's inability to estimate the correct 
quantity demanded, there is additional variations in the total quantity 
demanded due to customers' changes in the optimal quantity of electric 
power to consume. How these additional variations will affect the levels 
of reliability, the corresponding prices, and the level of total surplus 
is an important issue for further research. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
In this study, we first extended lin (1992b) by designing an 
alternative model under the Bertrand behavioral assumption and by 
performing sensitivity analysis on both the Cournot and Bertrand models. 
Interesting economic implications regarding critical elements of EOQ 
models such as the setup and inventory holding costs as well as the 
critical elements of microeconomic market theory such as the market 
price and the number of competing producers have been derived from the 
equilibrium conditions and subsequent sensitivity analyses. Next, we 
allowed the options of investing in reducing the setup and inventory 
holding costs are available to the producers and presented a unique 
insight as to why several Japanese and American producers are striving 
to reduce the setup costs under ever increasing competition. 
Specifically, it has shown that, for a profit maximizing producer, as 
the number of competing producers increases, his optimal strategy 
dictates that he reduce his setup and inventory holding costs. 
The EOQ model developed in the first two papers are applicable for 
broad classes of convex cost function and concave inverse demand 
function. Our models relate to general practices since numerous 
industries and firms apply EOQ based decision making under competition. 
There are several possible extensions that will further improve the 
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relevance of our models to general practices. They include incorporation 
of more sophisticated features such as quantity discount price 
schedules, finite production rates, shortages, delivery lags, and 
promotional (e.g., advertising) effects as well as stochastic demand 
rates. From the perspective of Zero Inventory Philosophy, it would be of 
interest to study the effects of competition on process quality 
improvement and effective capacity in conjunction with the setup cost 
reduction (see e.g., Porteus(1986) and Spence and Porteus(1987)). 
From the perspective of game theory, both Cournot model shown in 
the first two papers and Bertrand model shown in the first paper can be 
considered as only an initial step toward better understanding of 
competitive inventory policies. It is our hope that more sophisticated 
equilibrium concepts of game theory (e.g., subgame perfect equilibrium 
for sequential decisions) will be exploited in the future research on 
the competitive inventory policies. 
In the third paper, we have shown how to formulate the profit 
maximization problem for intermediary firms utilizing the special 
structure of the firms' environments. The optimal selling quantity and 
purchasing price are derived in terms of fixed and variable selling 
costs, supply proportionality constant, annual holding cost, selling 
price, inspection cost, and defect-rate. 
The observation that the price between producers and intermediary 
firms is determined by intermediary firms. From the aspects of 
producers, in order to operate efficiently, they must take the relation 
between the supply rate of inputs and their corresponding prices into 
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account. For such firms, the model in the third paper can be a basis for 
further research. 
In the fourth paper, for a single seller, we compared and 
contrasted the optimal inventory and pricing policies under profit 
maximization vs. ROIl maximization when demand is linear in price. 
Specifically, we have shown that when a cost factor such as the setup 
cost, inventory holding cost per unit per unit time, or per unit 
ordering cost after the setup is sufficiently high, the choice of the 
objective between profit maximization and ROIl maximization is 
inconsequential to the seller in so far as his optimal decisions are 
concerned. 
In the fifth paper, we extended the existing work on the priority 
rationing by incorporating the commonly shared random factors into the 
customers' valuation of electric power and the estimation uncertainty 
into the total amount of electric power demanded. Moreover, under the 
assumption that customers are risk-averse, we formulate an interruption 
insurance model to transfer the risk of customers to the risk-neutral 
electric power supplier. 
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